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ARTICLES
An Economic Approach to
the Law of Evidence
Richard A. Posner*
In this article, Judge Richard A. Posner presents the first comprehensive
economic analysis of the law of evidence. The article is presented in three
parts. First, Judge Posner proposes and describes two possible economic mod-
els, both a search and a cost-minimization approach, to describe how evidence
is obtained, presented, and evaluated. In both, he incorporates Bayes' theorem
to examine rational decisionmaking. Second, he examines the evidence-
gathering process, comparing and contrasting, in economic terms, the "in-
quisitorial" and "adversarial" systems ofjustice. The inquisitorial system, at
first glance, appears to be more economically efficient. This, though, may be
illusory, a result of the adversarial system's greater public visibility and wide-
spread acceptance ofplea bargaining. Finally, the article addresses burden of
proof issues, plus specific provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence: harm-
less error, limiting instructions, relevance, character evidence, hearsay, expert
witnesses, and various privileges and exclusionary rules. He concludes that
American evidence law, rather than simply sacrificing efficiency in order to
protect noneconomic values, is actually quite efficient and possibly superior to
its Continental, inquisitorial counterparts; but a number of reforms are sug-
gested.
The law of evidence is the body of rules that determines what, and how,
information may be provided to a legal tribunal that must resolve a factual
dispute. The importance of the accurate resolution of such disputes to an
economically efficient system of law has been discussed at length,1 but the
* Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of
Chicago Law School. I thank Elizabeth Beetz, Susan Burgess, Brian Bufler, Dimitri Karcazes,
Anup Malani, Kenneth Murphy, and Andrew Swartz for excellent research assistance; Ronald Al-
len, Gary Becker, Andrew Daughety, Gertrud Fremling, Bruce Kobayashi, Richard Lempert, Erzo
Luttmer, Eric Posner, Jennifer Reinganum, Michael Saks, Suzanne Scotchmer, Steven Shavell,
Stephen Stigler, Cass Sunstein, and participants in the University of Chicago's Seminar on Rational
Models in the Social Sciences for many very helpful comments on a previous draft; and Tomas
Philipson and Sherwin Rosen for enlightening conversations on the subject matter of the article.
1. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Accuracy in Adjudication, in I THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 1 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy
in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994); Richard A. Posner, An
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economic literature dealing with the rules themselves is scanty in relation to
the scope and importance of evidence law.2 This article is the first compre-
hensive (though it is neither exhaustive nor definitive) economic analysis of
that law. It is in three parts. The first part proposes and elaborates an eco-
nomic model (actually two models, a search model and a cost-minimization
model) of evidence. The second part examines the basic structure and
structural rules of the evidence-gathering process; it includes an economic
comparison between the "inquisitorial" and "adversarial" systems of justice
and an analysis of issues relating to burden of proof. The third part is an
economic appraisal of salient provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the most influential American codification of such rules; it also takes up
some issues of evidentiary privilege and exclusion that the rules do not deal
with explicitly.
Like many other economic studies of the legal system, mine concludes
that the institutional and doctrinal structure of the American law of evidence
has a subtle, though intuitive, implicit, and incomplete economic logic. This
conclusion will startle. Most evidence professors, and even a few judges, 3
would, if asked, say that of course the American system of finding facts at
trial is inefficient, ludicrously so, and redeemed if at all by the noneconomic
values that the system protects. But that assessment is founded on incom-
plete analysis and on misleading anecdotage that is itself an artifact of a
Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399
(1973).
2. I shall be citing much of the economic literature in this article. For other contributions, see
generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 599-605, 621, 647, 749-52 (5th ed.
1998); Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Richard Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary Sys-
tem? A General Theory ofLitigation Advice and Its Regulation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 313 (1991); Bruce
L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective, 26 J.
LEGAL STUD. 413 (1997); Jeffrey S. Parker, Daubert's Debut: The Supreme Court, the Economics
of Scientific Evidence, and the Adversarial System, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1995); Frederick
Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, On the Degree of Confidence for Adverse Decisions, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 27 (1996); Symposium, The Economics of Evidentiary Law, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1531
(1998); Peter T. Wendel, A Law and Economics Analysis of the Right to Face-to-Face Confronta-
tion Post-Maryland v. Craig: Distinguishing the Forest from the Trees, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405
(1993); MICHAEL BLOCK, JEFFREY S. PARKER, OLGA VYBORNA & LIBOR DUSEK, FACT-FINDING
EFFICIENCY IN LEGAL PROCEDURE: AN EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISON OF ADVERSARIAL VERSUS
INQUISITORIAL REGIMES (Univ. of Ariz., College of Bus. & Pub. Admin., Dep't of Econ., Discus-
sion Paper 98-1, June 1998); ANDREW F. DAUGHETY & JENNIFER F. RENGANUM, ON THE
ECONOMICS OF TRIALS: ADVERSARIAL PROCESS, EVIDENCE AND EQUILIBRIUM BIAS (Vanderbilt
Univ., Dep't of Econ. & Bus. Admin., Working Paper No. 98-W02, Apr. 1998); Chris William
Sanchirico, Games, Information and Evidence Production, with Application to Legal History and
'Decoupling' (Oct. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Southern Califor-
nia Law School); and for a useful bibliography, see Jeffrey S. Parker & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Evi-
dence, in BIBLIOGRAPHY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (forthcoming 1999). A larger literature deals
with issues in the economics of pretrial discovery and procedure generally that somewhat overlap
the issues discussed in this article. See POSNER, supra, at 599-644.
3. For a classic statement, see Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal Fiew,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975).
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worthwhile feature of the American system-the high degree of public scru-
tiny that it invites and enables.4 Neither cheap nor highly accurate, our ad-
versarial system is radically imperfect from the Utopian standpoint so often,
though mistakenly, used to evaluate social institutions. Yet even from a per-
spective concerned only with economic efficiency in the sense of wealth
maximization or cost minimization, it may not be inferior to the feasible al-
ternatives, including the Continental inquisitorial system much touted in
some quarters of the American legal academy.
I both emphasize the close connection between rules of evidence and the
use of the jury and make repeated reference to Bayes' theorem. So let me
make clear at the outset that I do not propose that juries or, for that matter,
judges be instructed in the elements of Bayesian theory or mathematical
probability more generally-or any other theory of probability or evidence.
Such efforts at formalizing the tacit, intuitive inferential procedures now em-
ployed to resolve factual disputes in trials would cause endless confusion.
Not only do few members of the general population have even a rudimentary
education in mathematical probability theory or in the theory of rational
choice that underlies both mathematical probability theory and economic
theory; but legal education itself (alas) "produces no improvement in the
ability to apply the statistical and methodological rules of the probabilistic
sciences to either scientific studies or everyday-life events."'5 The value of
Bayes' theorem in the law of evidence is heuristic. The most influential
model of rational decisionmaking under conditions of ineradicable uncer-
tainty (conditions which require that decision be based on subjective prob-
abilities), it can be of great help, as we shall see, in evaluating the rationality
of rules of evidence.
Although economic theory provides the framework of analysis in this ar-
ticle, I draw heavily on an empirical literature on trials and evidence that is
largely psychological in orientation, as well as on Bayes' theorem, other as-
pects of decision theory, and statistical inference. The approach is therefore
eclectic rather than narrowly economic, although it slights epistemological
and other philosophical perspectives on the trial process, which seem to me
to have only a very limited utility. The article's explanatory findings and
reformist suggestions are summarized in the Conclusion-a glance at which
will show that, despite the still-widespread belief that economic analysis of
law has an inherent tendency toward politically conservative reforms, this is
clearly not true with regard to the law of evidence.
4. See Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends about the Civil Justice
System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1998).
5. Darrin R. Lehman, Richard 0. Lempert & Richard E. Nisbett, The Effects of Graduate
Training on Reasoning: Formal Discipline and Thinking About Everyday-Life Events, 43 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 431, 440 (1988).
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I. THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO EVIDENCE
A. How to Proceed
There are many possible ways of coming to grips with the economic is-
sues that the law of evidence presents. The simplest would be to take up the
various rules piecemeal and examine their economizing properties. Another
way would be to deduce the optimal system of dispute resolution from eco-
nomic theory and compare it with the actual systems in use in this and other
countries. A third would be to begin with the epistemological and psycho-
logical literatures dealing with rational inquiry.6 A fourth would be to build
from what is now an extensive empirical literature on the actual operation of
the various methods (especially the jury, the focus of this literature) for de-
termining facts at trial.7 A fifth would be to see how the private sector re-
solves disputes and to use its methods as a model, since private dispute re-
solvers have stronger incentives than public ones to maximize the net bene-
fits of the dispute-resolution process. A sixth approach would be to examine
all the possible goals of the law of evidence and try to establish the weight
that economic goals should be given.
None of these approaches can be disregarded in a responsible economic
analysis of evidence, and I shall touch on all of them at some point in this
article. It seems best to begin, however, at an abstract level (the second ap-
proach sketched above), by asking: If we were writing on a clean slate and
trying to design a system for the resolution of factual disputes in litigation
that would be economically efficient in the broadest sense, how would we
frame our inquiry? I propose two ways, which are equivalent.
6. A good recent treatise on rational decisionmaking is DAVID A. SCHuM, THE EVIDENTIAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILISTIC REASONING (1994) (approaching evidence from "the fields of
law, philosophy and logic, probability, semiotics, artificial intelligence, psychology, and history").
For specific reference to the pros and cons of a Bayesian approach to the law of evidence, see
PROBABILITY AND INFERENCE IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: THE USES AND LIMI'S OF BAYESIANISM
(Peter Tillers & Eric D. Green eds., 1988). For helpful discussions of the cognitive quirks that
impede rational decisionmaking, see RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE:
STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980); DETLOF VON WINTERFELDT &
WARD EDWARDS, DECISION ANALYSIS AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 530-59 (1986); and Albert J.
Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L. REV. 273 (1989). I
discuss some of the epistemological issues involved in the use of the legal process to make factual
determinations in my book, The Problems of Jurisprudence, but I no longer agree with everything I
said there, particularly with my criticisms of the jury system. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 203-19 (1990).
7. For excellent illustrations of this literature, see Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex
Cases: Taking Stock after Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181
(Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries
(Should) Make Decisions?, 6 So. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (1997).
1480 [Vol. 51:1477
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B. The Search Model
The first way is to model factfinding as a problem in search, analogous
to searching for a consumer durable, 8 with the correct answer to the question
of (say) "Did X shoot Y?" corresponding to the utility-maximizing choice
between two brands of dishwasher.9 It is only an analogy. Not only are the
incentives of the participants not the same in the two search processes, but
external effects are also more likely in the case of the evidence search. I
shall try to account for the differences later.
The search process, which in the litigation setting is the process of ob-
taining, sifting, marshaling, presenting, and (for the trier of fact) weighing
evidence, confers benefits and incurs costs. 10 Benefits are a positive function
of the probability (p) that if the evidence is considered by the trier of fact the
case will be decided correctly, and of the stakes (S) in the case. To keep
things simple, I shall assume that the benefits are simply the product of the
two terms, hence pS, where p is a positive function of the amount of evi-
dence (x), so that the full expression for the benefits of the search is p(x)S.
With enough evidence, p might equal 1, meaning that a trial would be certain
to produce the correct outcome. The costs of the trial (c) are also a positive
function of the amount of evidence (x).
Some of these assumptions will have to be relaxed later, but for now, the
net benefits (B(x)) of what I am calling the "evidence search" in a case are
given by
B(x) = p(x)S- c(x) (1)
and thus the optimum amount of search-the amount that maximizes net
benefits-satisfies
pxS = cx (2)
where the subscripts denote derivatives. In words, the search should be
carried to the point at which marginal cost and marginal benefit are equated.
The amount of evidence at the optimum point will be greater the higher the
8. See, e.g., Sridhar Moorthy, Brian T. Ratchford & Debabrata Talukdar, Consumer Informa-
tion Search Revisited: Theory and Empirical Analysis, 23 J. CONSUMER RES. 263 (1997); Asher
Wolinsky, Competition in a Marketfor Informed Experts'Services, 24 RA4ND J. ECON. 380 (1993).
9. A dichotomous choice is assumed in both the legal and consumer examples for the sake of
simplicity. Nothing of analytical relevance turns on the assumption.
10. Social and private benefits and costs must be distinguished, but that is for later.
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stakes in the case, the lower the cost of obtaining evidence, and the greater
the effect of evidence in increasing the likelihood of an accurate outcome.
For this optimum to exist, it is enough if p(x) is increasing at a decreas-
ing rate (p, < 0) and that c. is nondecreasing (c" > 0)." These conditions
are plausible. Begin with the benefits side: As more and more evidence is
obtained, the effect of additional evidence on the outcome of the case will
tend to decrease, especially if the searcher begins the search with the most
probative evidence, and that will be the rational procedure unless that evi-
dence is particularly costly to obtain. But this is a rather crude description of
a complex process, and let me complicate it a bit, using a search model de-
veloped by Martin Weitzman.1 2 Suppose there are n possible sources of evi-
dence; the sources are independent of each other (that is, discovering valu-
able evidence in one does not help you find valuable evidence in any other);
and each source has a known probability (p) of containing valuable evidence,
a known value (I) of that evidence should it turn out to be contained in the
source, and a cost (c) of exploring the source to discover whether it does
contain the evidence. Then for each source there will be an expected net
gain from searching ofpV- c. If we are searching among the sources for the
best one (for example, the best expert witness for our case, or the best char-
acter witness, or, in general, one witness or document where there are alter-
native possibilities), rather than seeking to accumulate evidence, it can be
shown that we should continue the search until we find a source that yields
evidence having a V (call it V*) that exceeds (pV- c)/p for all the unsearched
sources. Since (pV- c)/p is, equivalently, V- cip, and V> c/p for all c > 0,
this means stopping at the first success if each success has the same eviden-
tiary value. In the event of failure, we should next explore the source having
the highestp (assuming constant Vand c), lowest c, or highest V.
If the searcher cannot determine in advance which evidence is most
likely to be fruitful, his search procedure will resemble random sampling,
11. The second condition implies that there are no economies of scale in searching for evi-
dence. A simple version of Equation (1) that satisfies both conditions is
B(x) = (xI(x + 1))S- cx
where p takes the specific value ofxl(x + 1), and c(x) takes the specific value of cx (constant costs).
The optimum amount of evidence (x*) is then
x* = (Sic)'A' - 1
and is greater the higher the ratio of the stakes in the case to the unit cost of the evidence. Notice
that it increases at a diminishing rate as that ratio rises.
The condition that cx be nondecreasing is not strictly necessary. It is enough if it decreases
less rapidly than the benefits of the search decrease, so thatp.S < cs,.
12. See Martin L. Weitzman, Optimal Search for the Best Alternative, 47 ECONOMETRICA
641, 646-48 (1979).
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and as the size of a sample grows, the value of additional sampling in con-
ducing to a more accurate result rises at a falling rate. (Roughly speaking,
accuracy increases by the square root of the sample size.) So, under either
this or the previous model (or other plausible models of the search for evi-
dence), there will be declining marginal utility of search. Indeed, as we shall
see, beyond some point the marginal utility of additional searching for evi-
dence may turn negative. But there will be little tendency for the cost of ad-
ditional searching to fall as the search widens, and it may well begin to rise,
as the initial leads run out. I say "little," not "no," for two reasons. First, a
heavy initial investment in evidence gathering may generate leads that, for a
time, enable the searcher to obtain additional evidence at low cost. Second,
when aggregated over all cases, the cost of searching for evidence may actu-
ally fall with increases in the amount of evidence obtained, though only up to
a point. More accurate factfinding increases deterrence of wrongful conduct,
which in turn reduces the number of cases and hence the aggregate costs of
the legal process.
To see how accuracy in factfinding relates to deterrence, notice that the
expected cost of punishment (EC is actually the difference between the ex-
pected cost of punishment if one commits a crime (ECg =pgS, wherepg is the
probability of punishment if the accused is guilty and S is the sentence) and
the expected cost of punishment if one does not commit a crime (ECi = p1S
where pi is the probability of punishment if the accused is innocent and S is
as before). Hence EC = pgS - piS; equivalently, EC = (pg - pi)S, making it
transparent that if punishment is imposed randomly, so that the probability of
punishment is the same regardless of guilt (that is, if pg = pi), the expected
punishment cost for committing the crime will be zero. The more accurate
the process of determining guilt is, the less random punishment will be, and
so the greater will be the law's deterrent effect. 13 To put this point differ-
ently, greater accuracy in the determination of guilt increases the returns to
being innocent.
The point is not limited to criminal law. It applies to all areas of law in
which deterrence of unlawful behavior is an important objective. It shows
what a good investment expenditures on evidence can be. Granted, there is a
danger of exaggeration if one fails to distinguish between punishment that is
truly random and punishment that merely has a random component. Suppose
that a person with a criminal record is quite likely to be convicted of any
subsequent crime with which he is charged even if he did not commit that
crime. This will reduce the effect of the criminal law in deterring him from
committing subsequent crimes. At the same time, it will increase deterrence
against his committing the first crime, and it will also cause people with a
criminal record to steer clear of activities in which they might be arrested and
13. See Posner, supra note 1, at 412.
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falsely charged. So inaccuracy can increase as well as reduce deterrence.' 4
But probably (though this can only be a guess) the latter effect will predomi-
nate in most cases, even that of convicting second and other subsequent of-
fenders of crimes they have not committed. If the law enforcement authori-
ties concentrate their limited resources on such offenders because they are
easier to convict regardless of guilt, the expected punishment of first offend-
ers will decline because the authorities will devote fewer resources to prose-
cuting them.
Deterrence plays a starring role in the economic analysis of evidence be-
cause it links the concern with accuracy that is so central to the evidentiary
process with the economist's conception of law as a system for creating in-
centives for efficient conduct. Since the accurate determination of facts at
trial is important to the efficacy of law in imparting efficient incentives, ac-
curacy in adjudication is an economic as well as moral and political value.
C. The Cost-Minimization Model
An alternative way of modeling the search for evidence, one that derives
from familiar economic models of procedure and of negligence,15 is as a pro-
cess of cost minimization. Let p now be the probability of an erroneous
rather than of a correct outcome, and pS the cost of the error (the probability
of error weighted by the stakes). Suppose thatp = .1, implying that, on aver-
age, one of ten cases will be decided incorrectly. If the average stakes in
these cases are $100,000, then the expected cost of error is $10,000. The
specific assumption (that pS equals the social costs of error) is arbitrary. But
it is a reasonable guess that the social cost of an erroneous outcome will gen-
erally rise with the dollar equivalent of the stakes in the case. I will both de-
fend and qualify this assumption shortly.
The social goal of the evidentiary process is to minimize the sum of the
cost of error and the cost of error avoidance, that is, to minimize
C(x) =p(x)S + (x). (3)
Formally this is done by differentiating C(x) with respect to x and setting the
result equal to zero, yielding
14. For other examples of how inaccuracy in adjudication can actually enhance social welfare,
see Michael L. Davis, The Value of Truth and Optimal Standards of Proof in Legal Disputes, 10
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 343 (1994).
15. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAWV 58-60 (1987) (negligence); Posner, supra note 1, at 401 (procedure).
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-pXS = cX. (4)
That is, the search for evidence should be carried to the point at which the
last bit of evidence obtained yields a reduction in error costs equal to the cost
of obtaining the evidence. For this optimum to exist, it is enough if increases
in x have a diminishing effect in reducing pS and if, as before, c" is nonde-
creasing.
D. Some Additional Observations About the Models
"Costs" may seem too narrow a concept to serve as a criterion for
choosing among alternative rules of evidence. However, this objection may
rest on too narrow a concept of "costs." The costs of evidence search, in a
proper economic analysis, are not limited to time and other direct costs.
They include indirect costs resulting from the incentive effects of the search
process. Consider Federal Rule of Evidence 407, which forbids the use of
evidence that after the accident giving rise to the plaintiffs suit, the defen-
dant repaired the condition that caused the accident. The primary concern is
that the admissibility of such evidence would, by discouraging repairs, in-
crease the risk of future accidents. Law professors like to emphasize the in-
direct costs of rules of evidence, but by arguing that the law of evidence has
multiple goals rather than just the goal of accuracy in factfinding.16 The
economist will agree that accuracy (p in Equations (1) through (4)) is not the
only goal. Indeed, it is better described not as a goal at all but rather as one
of the factors that determines the net benefits of a search for evidence. The
other goals discussed in the evidence literature, such as providing catharsis to
quarreling parties, resolving disputes in a manner acceptable to the commu-
nity, safeguarding interests in personal liberty, and protecting other values
(as in the subsequent-repair example) are likewise best regarded not as dis-
tinct goals but rather as factors influencing one term or another in the basic
equations. Not only can noneconomic concerns thus be accommodated
within a framework of economic analysis, but the basic insight of that analy-
sis as applied to evidence law-that the law is engaged in making tradeoffs
between the accuracy and cost of trials-is also a familiar and even orthodox
theme in noneconomic writing about evidence law.17 The economic ap-
proach serves more to refine and extend than to challenge the intuitions of
the legal professional.
16. See, e.g., Michael L. Seigel, A Pragmatic Critique of Modern Evidence Scholarship, 88
NW. U. L. REV. 995 (1994) (stressing indirect costs and citing Laurence Tribe and Charles Nesson).
17. See, e.g., Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process,
94 YALE L.J. 1643, 1647-50 (1985).
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I can be a little more precise about how additional evidence nudges a
factual inquiry toward an accurate conclusion. In the most intuitive version
of Bayes' theorem, the posterior odds (the odds after a new piece of evi-
dence, x, is considered) that some hypothesis (say that X shot Y) is correct are
obtained by multiplying the prior odds by the ratio of (1) the probability that
the evidence would have been observed if the hypothesis were true to (2) the
probability that the evidence would be observed if the hypothesis were not
true, as in
92(R-x) = L x 2(I1) (5)
where Q is odds, 18 H is hypothesis, and L (the likelihood ratio) is
p(xH)/p(xH). Suppose that the new piece of evidence is testimony by by-
stander Z that he saw X shoot Y. Suppose further that the prior odds (92(H))
are 1 to 2 that X shot Y, while the probability that Z would testify that he saw
X shoot Y if X did shoot Y is .8, and the probability that he would testify that
he saw X shoot Y if X did not shoot Y is .1, so that the likelihood ratio is 8.
The posterior odds that Xshot Ywill therefore be 4 to 1.
Several qualifications to the economic analysis thus far presented should
be noted. One is that the stakes in a case are an imperfect measure of the
social benefits of additional evidence gathering. Imagine a dispute over li-
ability under a statute that was repealed after the dispute arose but that still,
not having been repealed retroactively, governs the dispute. If a lot of
money is involved, the optimum private investment in evidence gathering
may be very large because victory will confer (or conserve) substantial eco-
nomic rents; and yet the social benefits from a correct decision might be nil.
Or might not be: The expectation that any dispute arising under the statute
would be resolved by accurate methods, come what may, might have induced
efficient behavior when the statute was in force.
The broader point is that parties may underinvest in the search for evi-
dence in some cases because accuracy in adjudication confers benefits on
nonparties by increasing the deterrent efficacy of the law, while overinvest-
ing in others for rent-seeking reasons. But it is a reasonable conjecture that
in general, if not in every case, the larger the stakes (they need not, of course,
be pecuniary) the more important it is from a social as well as private stand-
point that the case be decided correctly. If inaccuracy reduces deterrence and
18. n (Hjx) =p(Hx)/p( x), and 9 (H) =p(B)p(H). The tilde (-) means "not" If, in the ex-
ample in the text, the probability, given Xshot Y, that Z would testify that he saw the shooting is .4,
and the probability that, given Xdid not shoot Y, Z would nevertheless testify that he saw him do it
is .1, then the odds that Xshot Yare 4 to 1 (or, equivalently, 4). If (before Z's testimony) the prob-
ability that X shot Y was .I and the probability that he did not was .2, the odds that X shot Y (the
prior odds) would be I to 2 (or .5).
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hence compliance with law, it will impose greater social costs the bigger the
case. It is more important to deter billion-dollar oil spills resulting from
negligence than million-dollar oil spills resulting from negligence.
A second qualification is that altering posterior odds may not have much
or even any social value even if the likelihood ratio of the new evidence is
high, as in our shooting example, where it was 8. The value of the evidence
will depend on the prior odds and on the decision rule. Suppose that the
prior odds (as a consequence of the previously presented evidence) that X
shot Yare not I to 2 but 1 to 10 and that forXto be held liable for the shoot-
ing the trier of fact must consider the odds that he did it to be at least 1.01 to
1 (the preponderance standard). Then the new evidence, since it would not
lift the posterior odds above the threshold (multiplying the prior odds by a
likelihood ratio of 8 yields posterior odds of only 1 to 1.25), would have no
value. This would also be the case if, with the prior odds unchanged at 1 to
2, the trier of fact must reckon the odds to be at least 9 to 1 (one possible in-
terpretation of the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard) in order to find
against X; for the posterior odds are only 4 to 1.
A final qualification is that investments in evidence may yield benefits
that go beyond altering the outcome of particular cases. Take the simple
case in which the outcome depends solely on the ratio of the investments of
each side. A, say, will beat B if A spends twice as much as B; otherwise B
will win. Then a proportional reduction in each side's expenditures will not
alter the outcome. But it may well reduce the amount of information gener-
ated for the consideration of the tribunal, and by doing so may increase the
variance of the actual as distinct form the expected outcome and also in-
crease the likelihood of an appeal by reducing confidence in the accuracy of
the outcome.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE FACTUAL INQUIRY
A. Inquisitorial versus Adversarial Systems, with Special Reference to the
American Jury
1. The 'pure" systems compared.
The benefits and costs of searching for evidence, and so the optimal kind
and amount of such search, vary with the type of searcher. Begin with the
case in which the only searcher is a professional judge. That is a caricature
of the inquisitorial system that prevails in Continental Europe, Japan, and
most other non-English-speaking countries, for although lawyers play a
smaller role in developing evidence in an inquisitorial system than they do in
an adversarial one, it is not trivial (it also varies from country to country).
But I wish to make the contrast between the systems as stark as possible, and
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so I shall treat tendencies as if they were their extremes. 19 Therefore I shall
not only ignore the role of the lawyer as an evidence searcher in the inquisi-
torial system, but also treat trial by jury as the sole form of trial in the adver-
sarial system.
It might seem that our searcher-judge would be an extremely efficient
searcher, because of selection, training, and experience.20 But maybe not.
Since it is difficult to evaluate legal factfinding and thus to criticize a judge
for having made erroneous findings or praise him for good ones, the judge's
incentive to exert himself to do a good job will be limited. In addition, if he
is highly paid, the cost of search may be substantial. The amount of search
conducted, moreover, will depend on the number of judges and auxiliary ju-
dicial personnel, and that number may be determined without much regard to
the socially optimal amount of search. In addition, the public may lack con-
fidence in the judge's search and in the conclusions he draws from it because
the process of judicial inquiry in an inquisitorial system, like grand jury pro-
ceedings in the United States, is carried on mainly behind closed doors. And
there is a danger that the judge will render the "popular" result in a case, irre-
spective of justice.
In the adversarial process exemplified by the modem American civil jury
trial, the evidence search is conducted separately by the lawyers for the op-
posing sides and presented to a nonexpert, ad hoc, multiheaded tribunal for
decision. Because trial lawyers are compensated directly or indirectly on the
basis of success at trial, their incentive to develop evidence favorable to their
client and to find the flaws in the opponent's evidence is very great and, if it
is a big money case, their resources for obtaining and contesting evidence
will be ample. If the size of the stakes in a case is at least a rough proxy for
the social costs of an inaccurate decision, there will be at least a rough
alignment between the amount of search that is actually conducted and the
amount that is socially optimal.
The amount of search is driven not by the stakes alone, however, but also
by the likely effect of the marginal bit of evidence on the outcome. Recall
19. The very simplest example of factual inquiry would be that of a parent investigating a dis-
pute between two of his or her children. Bentham seems to have considered this the appropriate
model for the system of legal evidence, though not a model to be followed slavishly. See 1 JEREMY
BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 6-8 (J.S. Mill ed., London, Hunt & Clarke 1827).
See generally Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Scholarly and Institutional Challenges to the Law of Evidence:
From Bentham to the ADR Movement, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 837 (1992). For descriptions of the
differences between adversarial and inquisitorial handling of evidence problems, see MIRJAN R.
DAMA8KA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT (1997); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL
STUDY 93-103 (1988); John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 823 (1985).
20. It is commonly remarked, as though the point were obvious, that the inquisitorial ap-
proach is more efficient than the adversarial approach. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, The Conver-
gence of the Continental and the Common Law Model of Criminal Procedure, 7 CRIM. L.F. 471
(1996). This article challenges that assumption.
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from Equation (2) that the marginal benefit of a piece of evidence is given by
p.S, where px is the effect of the evidence on the probability that the trial will
reach the right result (whether from a social or, as here, where we are con-
sidering the incentives of lawyers rather than judges, a private standpoint).
This implies that, other things being equal, more evidence will be obtained
the closer the case is.21 The closer the case, the more of an effect on the out-
come additional evidence is likely to have and so the more likely such evi-
dence is to be furnished to the trier of fact. If the case is one sided, addi-
tional evidence, even though highly probative considered by itself, may have
no effect on the outcome.
The incentive to present more evidence the closer the case is (other
things being equal) has a tendency to promote efficiency, but no stronger
statement is possible. It is easy to imagine cases in which the additional evi-
dence induced by the closeness of the case has no social product. Suppose
that party A can increase the probability of a favorable outcome by one per-
cent by adducing one more bit of evidence at cost X. And suppose that his
opponent, B, can nullify that one percent shift in A's favor by adding another
bit of evidence, evidence favorable to B, also at cost X. If each party puts in
his additional evidence, a cost of 2 x X will be incurred without any change
in the expected outcome. The example, however, is somewhat unrealistic. If
A can anticipate B's response, A has no incentive to put in the additional evi-
dence. A and B will jointly benefit from agreeing to keep the evidence out.22
The competitive character of the search process and the presentation of
the results to a body of amateur judges (the jurors) that does not itself par-
ticipate in the gathering of the evidence makes it difficult to situate the ad-
versarial system on a continuum with the inquisitorial. The model for the
latter is a police investigation, but for the former it is the debate. The de-
bater's tools are the tools of rhetoric, the set of techniques for inducing belief
in matters involving irremediable uncertainty that often is due to the audi-
ence's lack of sophistication. As emphasized by theorists of rhetoric begin-
ning with Aristotle, an important dimension of effective rhetoric (called the
"ethical appeal") is making the speaker, as well as the speech, credible. The
economics of consumer search sketched in Part I again provides a helpful
parallel.23 Some consumer goods are what are called in economics "credence
goods." A good is a credence good if the consumer cannot readily determine
its quality by inspection or even use, so that he has to take its quality "on
faith." The importance of credibility in a rhetorical system of justice and the
21. See Avery Katz, Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure, 8 INT'L REV. L. &
EcoN. 127 (1988).
22. A stipulation (agreement) of the parties to limit evidence will normally be enforced. If
lawyers were perfect agents of their clients, such stipulations would be even more common than
they are, but they are common.
23. For a faller discussion, see RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 498-530 (1995).
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incentives of lawyers to enhance the credibility of their witnesses without
regard for the truth explain the emphasis that adversary systems place on
cross-examination and rebuttal and the corresponding suspicion of hearsay
evidence, which, defined functionally, is simply testimony that is not subject
to cross-examination.24
The significance of cross-examination is often misunderstood, and its so-
cial value consequently underappreciated, because of failure to consider the
deterrent effect of the right of cross-examination. Because cross-
examination can destroy a witness's credibility, it rarely does so in practice
and so is mistakenly denigrated. The witness whose credibility would be
destroyed by cross-examination will not be called at all or will try to pull the
sting of the cross-examiner by acknowledging on direct examination the
facts that a cross-examiner could be expected to harp on.
The adversary system makes it difficult for litigants to signal the strength
of their case. Just as poker players must bluff occasionally to avoid reveal-
ing the strength of their hand and thus losing the strategic advantage of se-
crecy, so a lawyer who has a weak case must pretend to have a strong one in
order to avoid tipping his hand. One might expect, however, that some law-
yers would specialize in strong cases, so that the fact that the lawyer had
been retained would signal that the case was strong and thus induce a favor-
able settlement. This would be a cheap and reliable method of signaling.
But I do not think it is widespread.
The adversary system may seem less efficient than the inquisitorial
merely because it involves two searchers (or teams of searchers)-the coun-
sel for the opposing sides-rather than one (the judge). There is duplication
and hence there are added costs. And because the searchers are not disinter-
ested, the system needs procedures for preventing concealment and distortion
of evidence. When permitted to do so, as they are in the American legal
system, lawyers assist (some would say they coach) their witnesses to make
the witness's story credible; lawyers understand the importance to effective
rhetoric of the ethical appeal. Such assistance is not altogether a bad thing.
It can remind the witness of true facts that he may have forgotten, help him
to articulate his recollections in an intelligible form, and show him how to
testify in compliance with the rules of evidence.
Because the private benefits of searching for evidence may exceed or fall
short of the social benefits, privatizing the search (as in the adversarial sys-
tem) may result in too much or too little evidence from a social standpoint, as
we have seen, whereas in principle (a tremendous qualification, however) the
inquisitorial judge can continue his search for evidence until he reaches the
point at which marginal cost and marginal benefit intersect and he can stop
24. The witness can be cross-examined, but not the out-of-court declarant whose "testimony"
the witness is repeating.
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right there. The judge in the adversary system can, however, limit the
amount of search, too. He can do this not only by curtailing pretrial discov-
ery, setting an early trial date, and limiting the length of the trial (all meas-
ures that judges in our system are authorized to employ), but also by ex-
cluding evidence at trial under the authority of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. (It is true that by the time a Rule 403 motion is made, the evi-
dence will be gathered. But parties are unlikely to gather evidence if they
expect the judge to exclude it at trial.) The relevance and hearsay rules also
conduce to this end. The function of the rules of evidence in limiting the
external costs generated by an adversary system is one reason why such rules
are less important in an inquisitorial system.25
The law cannot force the parties to search more than the case is worth to
them merely because the additional search would confer a social benefit. But
it can force them to collect somewhat more evidence than they might if left
to their own devices, as we shall see when we consider the rules governing
the burden of production.
Because the jury is an ad hoc tribunal, a significant amount of time is
consumed at the outset of trial in the selection of the members of the tribunal.
And because it is inexperienced, a professional judge is needed to guide it,
and the pace of the trial is slowed down by the need to educate the jurors in
the rudiments of their job. In the federal courts, civil jury trials are on aver-
age more than twice as long as civil bench (that is, judge) trials.26 So there is
no saving of judge time by employing a jury; rather the contrary, though with
some offset because the judge does not have to decide the case or write an
opinion. The rules of evidence, it is frequently argued, would be largely un-
necessary if there were no jury trials; they are mainly designed to protect
laymen from making cognitive errors as a result of inexperience. And so the
formulation and application of those rules are another cost of trial by jury.
Trial by jury also magnifies differences in ability between opposing
counsel because the judge, for fear of interfering with the jury's decision-
making, cannot easily redress the balance by questioning the witnesses him-
self or suggesting lines of argument, as he could in a bench trial. This is not
entirely a bad thing, because trial by jury penalizes bad lawyers more than
nonjury trials do and so might produce, in Darwinian fashion, a higher qual-
25. See GORDON TULLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL: THE PURE THEORY OF LEGAL PROCEDURE
151-57 (1980); Konstantinos D. Kerameus, A Civilian Lawyer Looks at Common Law Procedure,
47 LA. L. REV. 493, 500 (1987); Franklin Strier, What Can the American Adversary System Learn
from an Inquisitorial System ofJustice?, 76 JUDICATURE 109, 109 (1992). An alternative approach
would be a regulatory ("Pigouvian") tax on evidence, but there would have to be a subsidy for those
cases in which the parties underinvest in evidence from a social standpoint. The implementation of
such a tax-subsidy scheme would, unfortunately, require far more information than the government
could feasibly obtain.
26. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 193 n.1
(1996).
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ity of lawyer than bench trials in which the judge seeks to compensate for the
inadequacies of the weaker lawyer. Yet "goodness" here includes the un-
scrupulous mastery of deceitful rhetorical tricks. Finally, and seemingly
most tellingly, it may seem obvious that the jurors' inexperience and naivet6
will reduce the likelihood of an outcome that corresponds to the true facts of
the case. Not only do the jurors have higher information costs than profes-
sional judges do, but they also may be more subject to cognitive illusions and
emotionalism than a professional judge who has "seen it all before."
But this is only part of the picture. The competitive character of the ad-
versary process gives the searchers (the lawyers) greater incentives to search
hard than in a system where the judge is the principal or only searcher.27
Competition always involves duplication of effort yet more often than not
yields more than offsetting benefits, and it may do so in a trial. To put this
point differently, the adversarial system relies on the market to a much
greater extent than the inquisitorial system does, and the market is a more
efficient producer of most goods than the government. Professor Langbein, a
distinguished defender of the inquisitorial approach, recognizes that the ad-
versarial approach has the advantage that it "aligns responsibility with in-
centive" and "is an undoubted safeguard against official sloth" but offers a
"straightforward" answer to this concern: "The judicial career must be de-
signed in a fashion that creates incentives for diligence and excellence. '28
This is easier said than done, and may in fact be quite infeasible in America's
political culture.29 Some evidence of this is the widespread dissatisfaction
with American administrative agencies, which employ methods and proce-
dures (expert judges, no jurors, relaxed rules of evidence, and more control
by the tribunal over evidence gathering) that somewhat resemble those of
inquisitorial systems.
We must not rest, however, on a dogmatic preference for market alloca-
tion of resources but must consider concretely how competition might con-
duce to optimal evidence gathering. It might do this not only by inducing
greater efforts by each side to find supporting evidence but also by inducing
greater efforts to find the flaws in the other side's evidence. 30 Greater efforts
would not apply across the board; rather, as I have also pointed out, there
would be greater efforts the larger the stakes and the closer the case, hence
greater in those cases where a more thorough and careful marshaling and
evaluation of evidence are likely to confer greater social benefits. In general,
27. See Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, Advocates, 107 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1999).
28. Langbein, supra note 19, at 848.
29. See John C. Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil Pro-
cedure, 75 IowA L. REv. 987 (1990).
30. The latter point is emphasized in GIULIANA PALUMBO, OPTIMAL "EXCESSIVE"
LITIGATION IN ADVERSARIAL SYSTEMS (ECARE, Universit6 Libre de Bruxelles, Working Paper
No. 98-01, June 1998).
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moreover, the party having the objectively stronger case will be able to ob-
tain evidence favorable to it at lower cost than the opposing party can obtain
evidence favorable to itself.3' So the competitive system of gathering evi-
dence will tend to favor the party who would win in an error-free world.
32
The adversarial system also facilitates the drawing of reliable inferences
from evidentiary lacunae.33 If one party ought to be able to obtain favorable
evidence to itself at low cost, then its failure to present such evidence allows
the trier of fact to infer that the party is concealing unfavorable evidence and
should therefore lose.
Although the average juror may be less bright and will certainly be less
experienced in adjudication, than the average judge, "two heads are better
than one"--and six, eight, or twelve inexperienced heads may be better than
the one experienced head when they pool their recollections and deliberate to
an outcome. The judge does not merely preside, moreover; he can take the
case away from the jury by granting a new trial or, if the evidence is com-
pletely one-sided, a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
if the jury seems to him to have screwed up. The twelve heads are really
thirteen. And depending on the type of case, the jurors may be more like the
witnesses and parties, in terms of social background, occupation, education,
life experience, race, mores, and outlook, than the judge is. That may make
it easier for them to understand, and to determine the credibility of, the wit-
nesses than it is for the judge to do so. This is most likely to be true in per-
sonal injury tort cases and in criminal cases, but together these two catego-
ries account for most jury trials.34
31. Ideally, the cost of producing favorable evidence should be infinite to the party who de-
serves to lose. If it were, the fact that parties have incentives to lie under a regime of competitive
evidence gathering would not lead to erroneous results. See Chris William Sanchirico, Enforcement
by Hearing: An Integrated Model of Evidence Production (Dec. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with Columbia University Dep't of Econ. and Columbia Law School).
32. See Luke M. Froeb & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Naive, Biased, yet Bayesian: Can Juries In-
terpret Selectively Produced Evidence?, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 257, 266 (1996); see also Paul Mil-
groin & John Roberts, Relying on the Information of Interested Parties, 17 RAND J. ECON. 18, 25
(1986).
33. See Hyun Song Shin, Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration, 29 RAND J.
ECON. 378, 404 (1998) (in an adversarial system, "the absence of a conclusive submission by either
the plaintiff or defendant can be treated as a signal in itself').
34. In the most recent year for which statistics are available (1996 for state cases, 1997 for
federal), 74% of all jury trials in the United States were either personal injury tort cases or criminal
cases. For the data on which this statistic is based, see ExAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS,
1996: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 25, 28 (Brian J. Ostrom
& Neal B. Kauder eds., 1997); JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 1997, at 152-
54 tbl.C-4, 359-61 tbl.T-1 (visited Apr. 30, 1999) <http://www.uscourts.gov/judicial-business
/contents.html>. The state figure on which this estimate is based is only an approximation, how-
ever, as there is no comprehensive "personal injury" category. I therefore approximated it as the
sum of "auto [torts]" and "medical malpractice."
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If judges as well as jurors are prone to make cognitive errors or be over-
come by emotion, trial by jury may actually proceed more rationally than
trial by judge, since in a bench trial there is no gatekeeper protecting the trier
of fact from confusing or excessively prejudicial evidence. The point is less
that we need rules of evidence because we have juries than that we have no
mechanism for enforcing rules of evidence against judges. There would
have to be a screening judge to keep inadmissible evidence from the trial
judge. The latter would be humiliated by being deemed unable to keep in-
admissible evidence of which he was aware from influencing his decision.
But probably he would be unable to keep from being influenced by such evi-
dence. Indeed, it is not even certain that judges are less prone to cognitive
illusions than jurors. The literature on these illusions provides some basis for
thinking that market settings tend to dispel or at least reduce them,35 but none
for thinking that government processes have similar effects.36 We shall see,
however, that there is at least a small amount of evidence that judges are less
prone to cognitive illusions than juries.
Gatekeeping is one way of combating cognitive illusions; another is the
adversary process itself. If, for example, the lawyer for one party uses
"framing" to influence a witness's testimony, the other lawyer can reframe
the question on cross-examination to offset the effect of his opponent's
framing. This is another respect in which the adversarial system (with jury)
may be better at dealing with cognitive illusions than the inquisitorial sys-
tem.
Jurors have, moreover, a certain freshness that many judges lack. The
judge may be case-hardened and therefore less likely to attend to the par-
ticulars of a new case. Bayes' theorem shows that the judge's case-hardened
attitude may be quite rational. The higher one's prior odds, the less search a
Bayesian will do, other things being equal. Suppose a judge, by virtue of
having presided in many similar cases, reckons at the outset of a new case
that the odds that the defendant is guilty are 100 to 1. He will have little in-
centive to pay close attention to the evidence presented at trial, because evi-
dence of the defendant's guilt will not alter his original judgment, while evi-
dence of the defendant's innocence, unless extremely powerful, will not push
the posterior odds into the range in which the judge would acquit the defen-
dant. For example, if in the case in which the judge's prior odds are 100 to 1
in favor of guilt the evidence creates a likelihood ratio of 8 to 1 that the de-
fendant is not guilty, the judge's posterior odds on guilt will still be 12.5 to 1.
35. See, e.g., Colin Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPER-
IMENTAL EcoNoMIcs 587, 674-75 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995); Vernon L. Smith,
Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology, 99 J. POL. ECON. 877, 884-88
(1991).
36. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1543-45 (1998).
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All this is perfectly rational. But when the pattern becomes understood,
litigants will no longer have an incentive to produce much evidence. (To see
this, think of the extreme case where the judge has made up his mind irrevo-
cably about the correct outcome of the case before any evidence is pre-
sented.) Eventually the accuracy of the litigation process will be severely
compromised, as the judge's prior odds, formed on the basis of trials in
which the parties did put in a lot of evidence, become less and less accurate.
The problem will be aggravated if, as many cognitive psychologists believe,
people succumb to "confirmation bias," meaning that they tend to interpret
evidence in the way most consistent with their prior beliefs. The fact that the
life-tenured judge on a fixed salary pays no penalty for succumbing to this
bias undermines his resistance to it. The dangers stemming from strong prior
odds are less acute in trial by jury.
A related point is that judges, by virtue of their experience, may take
shortcuts to decision, while jurors, being new to the process, may think more
carefully about the evidence. The judge's snap decision may be as good as
the jurors' more deliberate one-but it may not be better.
With its adversary character, and the need to present the evidence all at
once (a jury cannot be kept together indefinitely, whereas a judge can try a
case in stages over an indefinite period of time and delay issuing his decision
until long after the trial has ended),37 the American jury trial is much more
easily monitored by the public than an inquisitorial process modeled on a
police investigation. This is important in a culture that distrusts officials-
and so is the delegation of a large part of the judicial function to nonofficials,
the jurors and the lawyers (though when representing the government in
court they usually are government employees). With so much of the judicial
function privatized, the number of professional judges required to staff the
courts is much smaller than in inquisitorial judiciaries, 38 and this pattern ca-
ters to public mistrust of officialdom. Another way of understanding the
pattern is that a decision to have a small number of judges drives up the cost
of search by them, so that the search function devolves on others, the lawyers
and jurors, who might be considered excessively high-cost searchers (relative
to benefits) if judges were plentiful and judge search therefore cheap.
American popular mistrust ofjudges has a further significance. It has re-
sulted in most American judges being elected rather than appointed and in
37. See DAMASKA, supra note 19, at 60 (emphasizing the compression of the adversarial
compared to the inquisitorial trial and attributing it to the jury). In the United States as in Europe,
judge trials tend to last longer from beginning to end (although the amount of actual trial time is
less) because, not having to keep a jury together, the judge can interrupt the trial to attend to other
business.
38. For example, the ratio of lawyers to judges is 54.59 to 1 in the United States compared to
6.07 to I in France, 6.86 to 1 in Germany, and 2.86 to 1 in Switzerland. See RIcHARD A. POSNER,
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 28 tbl.1. 1 (1996).
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keeping judicial salaries well below the opportunity costs of the ablest law-
yers. The consequence is a vicious cycle (vicious if you do not like juries).
Because America mistrusts judges, American judges really are less trust-
worthy than judges in a culture of greater respect for officials. This in turn
narrows the competence gap between judges and jurors, and so reduces the
error costs of jury trials relative to bench trials. The gap is further narrowed
because, when judges are elected, repeat litigants, such as insurance compa-
nies, and specialized trial lawyers, such as the tort plaintiffs' bar, have strong
incentives to channel campaign contributions to judges who favor their inter-
ests. The incentives are blunted, and the bad effect on justice reduced, if de-
cisional responsibility is shared with jurors. A jury system also reduces the
incentive to bribe judges.39 And it counteracts the political bias inherent in
an elected judiciary. The judge who sits without a jury cannot blame the
outcome of a trial (which might be the acquittal of a political ally) on others;
he can diffuse responsibility if he sits with a jury. Jurors, unlike judges, do
not have career incentives to render verdicts that are popular with whoever
controls judicial careers.
Doubts about the competence of jurors are influenced by the assumption
that jurors constitute a random sample of the lay population, but the assump-
tion is false. In the federal system, the names of potential jurors are usually
taken from voter registration lists, so that people whose sense of civic re-
sponsibility is insufficient to motivate them to register to vote are in practice
disqualified from serving on a jury. The people whose names are chosen in
this way are sent summonses to jury duty, but the most irresponsible of these
people simply ignore them and there is rarely any follow-up. Then when the
cooperators are questioned by the judge as part of the process of jury selec-
tion, the potential jurors who do not want to serve make up excuses and are
usually let off. Challenges for cause eliminate the jurors who are likely to be
partial to one side or another, and peremptory challenges enable the lawyers
to act on inarticulable hunches to eliminate some of those who remain. The
prospects who make it through this gauntlet are not a random sample of the
inhabitants of the federal judicial district, but generally are above average in
competence, civic-mindedness, neutrality, and sense of responsibility (except
that peremptory challenges are sometimes used to exclude the ablest pro-
spective jurors-the ones most likely to see through the case presented by
the lawyer making the challenge). Contrary to legend, retired people are un-
derrepresented rather than overrepresented on juries.40 So, however, are the
busiest people, and some of them would make first-class jurors.
Even assuming that jurors are on balance as competent to resolve factual
disputes as (American) judges, we might worry that they have no incentive to
39. See Dewatripont & Tirole, supra note 27, at 30.
40. See RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 152 (1995).
[Vol. 51:14771496
HeinOnline  -- 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1496 1998-1999
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
exert themselves. They are less likely than judges to be criticized publicly
for reaching the "wrong" result (though this, as we saw, can be both good
and bad). They have no career stakes in doing their job as jurors well, and
their financial incentive to conduct a careful sifting of the evidence is nil.
Yet almost all judges who sit with juries are struck by their conscientious-
ness, whether or not the judge agrees with the jury's verdict. Part of the ex-
planation is the screening for conscientiousness that I have mentioned. More
important is what might be called the theatrics of trial by jury. American
judicial systems strive, apparently with some success, to create an atmos-
phere in which the jurors, caught up in the drama of decisionmaking, do their
best to render a sound verdict. This is no more (or less) surprising from the
standpoint of rational choice than the fact that an audience can be frightened
by a scary movie even though everyone knows that it is make-believe.
Well-publicized instances of crazy jury trials-interminable, uncivil,
lawless, resulting in outlandish verdicts and other egregious miscarriages of
justice, or all these things at once-have convinced some observers that the
American system is grossly inefficient. 41 But there are pitfalls in relying on
anecdote to shape public policy in a nation as vast and as blanketed by the
media as the United States. The very fact that the American jury trial facili-
tates public evaluation-that the mistakes of the system are harder to bury-
guarantees that the system will look less efficient than one that operates be-
hind a veil.
2. Mixed systems and feasible reforms.
For the sake of clarity I have been contrasting polar systems of gathering
and evaluating evidence in litigation-an inquisitorial system without any
participation by lawyers in the evidentiary process and an adversarial system
of jury trials. Actual systems are mixed-lawyers do play an evidentiary
role in the Continental legal systems, and only a small fraction of American
cases are decided by juries-and their best features could be combined. The
jury could in principle be abolished without jettisoning the adversary system,
as has essentially been done in civil cases in England, though I shall note that
England's system is less adversary than the American sense. More cases
could be channeled into arbitration, which mostly uses lay judges but ones
who, unlike jurors, have expertise. A number of suggested and some already
implemented reforms of the adversary system and corresponding reforms of
41. For arguments supporting this position from an economic standpoint, see TULLOCK, supra
note 25, at 87-105 and Gordon Tullock, Defending the Napoleonic Code over the Common Law, in
RESEARCH IN LAW AND POLICY STUDIES 3 (Stuart S. Nagel ed., 1988).
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the inquisitorial system offer promise of enhancing efficiency.42 Here are
some designed to make trial by jury more accurate: 43
1. Restoring the size of the civil jury to the traditional twelve (from six to
eight, its size in the federal system at present), in order to
a. obtain greater diversity of experience, which is important because
determining probabilities with regard to the sorts of uncertainty in-
volved in a trial draws heavily on the adjudicator's common sense,
which is shaped in turn by people's experiences,
b. exploit the Condorcet jury theorem on the superiority of collective to
individual judgment,44 and
c. reduce variance in outcomes by drawing on a larger, though still
small, sample of the community.45
2. Imposing educational qualifications on jurors in highly complex litiga-
tion.
3. Encouraging jurors to take a more active role in the search process by
permitting them to
a. take notes,
b. ask questions of the lawyers, witnesses, and judge,
42. See, e.g., PALUMBO, supra note 30, at 2, 19-20. On the growing convergence between the
Continental (inquisitorial) and Anglo-American (adversarial) systems, see, for example, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Phil Fennell, Christopher Harding, Nico J6rg & Bert
Swart eds., 1995); John D. Jackson, Playing the Culture Card in Resisting Cross-Jurisdictional
Transplants: A Comment on "Legal Processes and National Culture," 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 51 (1997); Kerameus, supra note 25.
43. Many of these are discussed in Saks, supra note 7 and Lempert, supra note 7, at 220-31,
and are summarized in SECTION OF LITIGATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CIVIL TRIAL
PRACTICE STANDARDS pt 1 (1998). See also Michael Honig, Jury Trial Innovations, N.Y. L-.,
Nov. 9, 1998, at 3.
44. See, e.g., Bernard Grofinan & Guillermo Owen, Condorcet Models, Avenues for Future
Research, in INFORMATION POOLING AND GROUP DECISION MAKING 93, 94 (Bernard Grofman &
Guillermo Owen eds., 1986). The theorem requires that each juror make an independent judgment,
that each have a probability greater than .5 that his judgment is correct, and-critically-that the
jury arrives at its outcome by majority vote. Suppose that each member of a 12-person jury has a .6
probability of being correct. Then the jury will reach the incorrect result only if 7 members are
wrong, and the probability of this is .47, which is only 15 percent Under a rule of unanimity, the
probability of error would be .4. But, because juries deliberate, an articulate majority can often win
over dissenters and obtain a unanimous verdict.
45. For evidence that larger juries increase accuracy and reduce variance, see Saks, supra note
7, at 14-15, 42-43, and Michael J. Saks & Mollie Weighner Marti, A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of
Jury Size, 21 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 451 (1997). Some cases are so huge that a single jury, even of 12,
is too small to assure accuracy commensurate with the stakes. This is a problem in mass tort class
action, when claims with aggregate stakes of literally billions of dollars may be combined for trial
before a single jury. The solution is to have a sample of the cases tried before separate juries. See
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995); Michael J. Saks & Peter David
Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits ofAggregation and Sampling in the Trial of
Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 841-51 (1992).
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c. read daily transcript, and, more doubtfully,
d. call witnesses.
4. Instructing jurors on the law before and during as well as at the close of
trial.
5. Explaining to jurors the basic rules of evidence so that they do not draw
inappropriate negative inferences from the withholding of evidence from
them. Jurors' ignorance of the rules of evidence can lead them to enter-
tain ungrounded suspicions of the honesty of lawyers and witnesses and
to draw erroneous "missing evidence" inferences. 46
6. Avoiding legal jargon in instructions-a problem so pervasive that some
empirical studies have found "that instructed jurors have no better grasp
of the law than uninstructed jurors" 47
7. Changing the rules of evidence so as to combat some of the cognitive
quirks that beset decisionmakers.
8. Shortening trials as much as possible so that jurors do not experience
information overload.
Accuracy is only one of two factors to be considered in an economic
analysis of evidence; cost is the other. But most of the suggested reforms are
virtually costless and some, like compressing the trial, might actually reduce
costs. The most costly reform would be to increase the size of the jury. The
larger the jury, the higher the opportunity costs of taking jurors from their
ordinary pursuits, both because more jurors would be needed and because
trials would be longer, since jury selection would take longer and jury delib-
erations would be more protracted. There would also be more hung juries,
and hence more retrials. But the added costs might well be offset by more
accurate factfinding, which a larger jury would promote. This should pro-
duce better deterrence, resulting, as noted earlier, in less wrongful conduct
and fewer trials-so the net increase in trial costs might be small or even
negative. Also, the settlement rate would be higher the more predictable the
outcome of the trial, and this, too, counteracts the effect of a larger jury on
aggregate trial costs.
I do not want to go overboard in praise of the large jury. Arbitration,
which as a privately created and financed method of adjudication provides a
valuable though not infallible benchmark for evaluating the efficiency of
46. For analysis and examples, see Bruce A. Green, "The Whole Truth? ". How Rules of Evi-
dence Make Lauyers Decei/fd, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 699 (1992).
47. Saks, supra note 7, at 35; see also Reid Hastie, David Schkade & John Payne, A Study of
Juror and Jury Judgments in Civil Cases: Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages, 22 LAW. &
HUM. BEHAV. 287, 304 (1998). It may, however, fall into the category of problems that are hope-
less but not serious. The instructions are determined before the lawyers' closing arguments to the
jury, and the lawyers are not permitted to argue to the jury legal positions inconsistent with the
instructions. In effect, then, the lawyers instruct the jury, but they do so consistently with the law as
laid down by the judge.
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public systems of adjudication, rarely involves more than three arbitrators,
and usually there is only one. This suggests that the costs of a larger panel
would exceed the benefits that I have just stressed. But implications for the
efficiency of the large jury are blurred by the fact that cases selected for ar-
bitration differ systematically from those adjudicated in courts. Almost all
are contract cases in which the parties agreed in the contract itself to arbitrate
disputes arising out of it, and perhaps in most of them the parties did not an-
ticipate disputes likely to involve stakes large enough to warrant more than a
brief and informal process of resolution. Although many multimillion dollar
contracts provide for arbitration and rarely, if ever, provide for arbitration by
a panel of more than three arbitrators, most contract cases, even when the
stakes are huge, turn on the language of the contract. Messy factual disputes
of the sort that a large panel of factfinders might be better able to resolve are
avoided. The benefits of additional arbitrators may therefore be slight even
in large cases.
Another variable in the design of trial by jury is the voting rule. Una-
nimity is the traditional rule, but some states have relaxed it. It is difficult to
say whether this is a good idea, apart from the effect on the number of cases
resulting in hung juries, which may however be slight if the unanimity re-
quirement gives way to a lesser supermajority requirement (for example,
conviction or acquittal by a 10 to 2 vote).48 On the one hand, deliberation is
likely to be more perfunctory if unanimity is not required. On the other
hand, unprincipled compromises, which may be necessary to secure unanim-
ity, are also less likely.
3. A summary comparison.
Because Americans mistrust officials more than people in most other
countries that are otherwise similar to the United States, an effective in-
quisitorial system would cost more here than in the countries in which it is
used;49 this may be one reason we have not adopted it. Beyond that, the em-
pirical evidence needed to make a responsible comparative evaluation of the
two types of system is largely nonexistent. In particular, there is little evi-
dence to support the often vociferous criticisms of the jury system."s Oppo-
nents of the jury and proponents of the inquisitorial system can, however,
point to two types of evidence. First, experimental evidence (limited, how-
48. See Alvin K. Klevorick & Michael Rothschild, A Model of the Jury Decision Process, 8 J.
LEGAL STuD. 141, 155 (1979); Edward P. Schwartz & Warren F. Schwartz, Decisionmaldng by
Juries Under Unanimity and Supermajority Voting Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 775, 787 (1992).
49. The English legal system may seem a counterexample, since it is an adversary system yet
the English population is famously (if diminishingly) respectful of officials. The appearance is
misleading; functionally, the English legal system is closer to the legal systems of the Continent
than to the U.S. system. See POSNER, supra note 38, at 20-36.
50. See Lempert, supra note 7, at 182,233-34.
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ever, to a single study) indicates that judges are less subject to hindsight bias
than jurors.51 Second, the conviction rate is lower in bench trials than injury
trials. This is significant because in most states the decision in a criminal
case as to whether to be tried by a judge or by a jury is entirely the defen-
dant's. If juries are less accurate guilt determiners than judges, innocent de-
fendants will choose to be tried by judges rather than run the risk of jury
mistake, while guilty defendants will choose to be tried by juries, hoping for
a mistake. The acquittal rate should therefore be higher in bench trials-and
it is52
Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg present some parallel evidence
for civil cases: In products liability and medical malpractice cases, bench
trials strongly favor plaintiffs and jury trials strongly favor defendants.5 3 The
plaintiffs choice of a bench trial, if he has a strong case, is explicable on the
same ground as the criminal defendant's choice of bench trial if he has a
strong case. The puzzle is why the civil defendant does not elect jury trial if
he has a weak case and thus needs a mistake by the trier of fact in order to
prevail. The authors think that defendants' lawyers have accepted popular
misconceptions that juries are inveterately pro-plaintiff. An alternative pos-
sibility is related to the assumed greater accuracy of judges. To say that ju-
ries are less accurate than judges is to say that there is greater variance
around the mean (the correct result, presumably) in jury than in judge deci-
sions. If a defendant has a very weak case, this greater variance may hurt
him. Suppose that the range of possible damages awards by a judge is
$10,000 to $100,000 (for a mean of $55,000) but for a jury in the same case
is $0 to $110,000 (same mean). If the defendant has no chance of persuading
the jury to award zero damages, he has more to lose from being tried by a
jury than by a judge. It is so because in a civil case the jury determines the
size of the sanction, but in a criminal case the judge does. As a result, jury
inaccuracy is likely to work to the disadvantage of the guilty defendant in the
civil case and to his advantage (as noted in the preceding paragraph) in the
criminal case.
I should note that what I am calling "jury inaccuracy" need not reflect a
difference in competence. It could reflect simply a difference in variance
resulting from the fact that there are many more jurors than there are judges,
and juries are more diverse because they lack the uniformity of outlook and
experience that judges tend to have by virtue of common training and voca-
51. See W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think about Risk?, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REv. (forth-
coming 1999) (manuscript at 17-20, 26, on file with author).
52. See Gerald D. Gay, Martin F. Grace, Jayant R. Kale & Thomas H. Noe, Noisy Juries and
the Choice of Trial Mode in a Sequential Signalling Game: Theory and Evidence, 20 RAND J.
ECON. 196,211 (1989).
53. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending
Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1162-66 (1992).
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tion. A defendant who has a weak case will tend to prefer a jury trial when
the jury is asked to make a binary decision (such as guilty or innocent, liable
or not liable), because in such a case variance can only work to his benefit by
reducing the expected punishment.5 4
Jurors doubtless are somewhat more lawless than judges, because they
do not internalize the values of law-following to the same extent as most
judges; this is the reason that we have rules that forbid revealing to the jury
that the defendant in a tort case has liability insurance. This point is some-
what to one side of the question of factfinding competence; more studies are
needed before it can be concluded with any confidence that the American
jury is a less accurate factfinder than the American, or even the European,
judge. If it is less accurate, however, it is probably less efficient, at least in
civil cases. The direct cost of jury trials plainly exceeds that of bench trials.
Only if a great deal of value is assigned to John Stuart Mill's "education in
citizenship" rationale, or to some other political value of jury trial, are the
added costs likely to be offset by greater benefits--except in criminal cases.
Distrust of officials is too great in America for people to be willing to entrust
their liberty solely to professional judges.
B. Burden of Proof
1. Burden ofproduction.
Burden of proof has two aspects, of which the first is important only in
an adversary system where the tribunal does not participate in the search for
evidence. This aspect is the burden (duty) of submitting evidence to the tri-
bunal, as distinct from the burden of persuading the tribunal that one ought to
win the case. The two burdens are intertwined; for one thing, the burden of
persuasion generally determines who has the burden of production. In the
ordinary civil case, the plaintiff's burden is to show that his position is more
likely than not correct. In other words, if at the end of the trial the jury either
thinks the defendant should win or does not know which side should win-
the evidence seems in equipoise-the plaintiff loses. This makes a plaintiff
who puts in no evidence very likely to lose. It makes sense, as a way of
economizing on the time of the tribunal (as well as reducing nuisance litiga-
tion), to require the plaintiff, as a precondition to getting to trial, to submit
evidence that if believed would be likely to carry the day with the jury, be-
fore the defendant is required to submit any evidence.55 This assumes that
the cost to the plaintiff of obtaining this evidence is not disproportionately
54. Suppose all judges are average, and the average judge will convict this defendant. The
average jury will also convict him, but one in ten juries will acquit him. Then he is better off
choosing ajury trial.
55. See generally Bruce L. Hay, Allocating the Burden of Proof 72 IND. L.L 651 (1997).
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greater than the cost to the defendant of obtaining contrary evidence (if there
is any). But if, as a result of modem pretrial procedures for discovering evi-
dence in the possession of the opposing party, the costs of searching for evi-
dence are symmetrical, the burden of production should indeed be on the
party that bears the burden of persuasion-that, is the plaintiff in the case of
the main claim but the defendant in the case of affirmative defenses, such as
consent, statute of limitations, laches, accord and satisfaction, incapacity,
preemption, and res judicata.
In the case of defenses, moreover, it would be inefficient to require the
plaintiff to anticipate and produce evidence contravening the indefinite num-
ber of defenses that a defendant might plead in a given case. Such a re-
quirement would also force the plaintiff to do the defendant's legal research
for him. The plaintiff would have to identify and counter defenses of which
the defendant might not have been aware as well as some which the defen-
dant might have good tactical or evidentiary reasons not to plead or that he
might not plead simply because he had one clearly dispositive defense. For
example, if the statute of limitations is a plausible defense in only five per-
cent of cases, making the plaintiff plead and prove that his suit was timely
would impose costs with no corresponding benefits in ninety-five percent of
cases. This discussion suggests that the nineteenth-century rule that the
plaintiff in a negligence case had to prove his lack of contributory negligence
as well as the defendant's negligence would have been sound from an eco-
nomic standpoint only if either (1) contributory negligence was a likely de-
fense in the vast majority of such cases, or (2) because pretrial discovery was
very limited, it would have been much more costly for the defendant than for
the plaintiff to determine whether the plaintiff had been negligent.
The economic rationale of rules governing the burden of production is
further illustrated by the McDonnell Douglas rule.56 Applied mainly in em-
ployment discrimination cases, the rule permits the plaintiff, say in a case of
racial discrimination in hiring, to establish his prima facie case (and thus
withstand a motion for summary judgment by the defendant) with evidence
merely that he was qualified for the job but was passed over in favor of
someone of another race. But the rule does more: Satisfying the just-
described burden of production creates a presumption of discrimination,
meaning that if the defendant puts in no evidence, the plaintiff is entitled to
summary judgment. The probability that he lost the job opportunity because
he was discriminated against might seem not to be very high if the only evi-
dence is as described. But this disregards the evidentiary significance of
missing evidence. If the defendant, who after all made the decision to give
the job to someone other than the plaintiff, maintains complete silence about
56. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Furmco Con-
struction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978).
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the reason for his action, an inference of discrimination arises. If the reason
was otherwise, he should have been able without great difficulty to produce
some evidence of that.
If the defendant breaks his silence and gives a noninvidious reason for
his action, and the plaintiff is unable to present evidence casting doubt on
that reason, then the plaintiff loses, again without a trial. If, however, the
plaintiff is able to contest the genuineness of the defendant's reason, the case
goes to the jury and the McDonnell Douglas rule falls out. A jury that dis-
believes the defendant's reason can infer that the plaintiff was indeed dis-
criminated against, but it need not do so;57 it may conclude that the defendant
is embarrassed by the reason that motivated his action and is concealing it,
even though it is not discriminatory.
The McDonnell Douglas rule is sometimes thought to be motivated by a
desire of "liberal" judges to make it easier for the plaintiff to prevail in a dis-
crimination case. My analysis suggests that the rule is justifiable in neutral
terms of minimizing cost, specifically minimizing the cost of trial in cases in
which the parties can be induced to "show their hand" before trial.
2. Burden ofpersuasion.
In the typical civil trial, there is no basis for supposing that Type I errors
(false positives, such as convicting an innocent person) on average impose
higher costs than Type II errors (false negatives, such as an erroneous ac-
quittal). So it is enough to justify a verdict for the plaintiff that the probabil-
ity that his claim is meritorious exceeds, however slightly, the probability
that it is not. But because the cost to an innocent defendant of criminal pun-
ishment may well exceed the social benefit of one more conviction of a
guilty person (in maintaining deterrence and preventing the person from
committing crimes for a period of time, namely while he is imprisoned pur-
suant to his conviction), Type I errors are more serious than Type II errors in
criminal cases and therefore are weighted more heavily in the former by the
imposition of a heavy burden of persuasion on the prosecution. 58
Trading off Type I and Type II errors is a pervasive feature of evidence
law. Take disputes over whether a given police lineup is unduly "sugges-
tive." If the other people in the lineup resemble the defendant very closely,
the chance of a Type I error (mistakenly identifying the defendant as the
criminal) is minimized, because the defendant does not "stand out." But the
chance of a Type II error (mistakenly failing to identify the defendant as the
57. For a comprehensive discussion of this issue, see Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332,
1337-38 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc).
58. See Posner, supra note 1, at 408-15.
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criminal) is increased, because it is easier to confuse the defendant with the
other people in the lineup.
Another but consistent way to explain the difference between the crimi-
nal and civil burdens of proof is by reference to the inherent advantages of
the prosecution in a criminal case, compared to a private plaintiff, in an ad-
versary system of justice, that is, a system of competitive evidence search.
The government has enormous prosecutorial resources.59 It can allocate
these across cases as it pleases, extracting guilty pleas by threatening to con-
centrate its resources against any defendant who refuses to plead and using
the resources thus conserved to wallop the occasional defendant who does
invoke his right to a trial. This is like the situation in which unequal access
to capital markets can make predatory pricing a rational strategy.60 The
analogy is closest and the strategy likely to be most effective when, as is
most commonly the case, the defendant cannot afford to hire counsel and is
dependent on court-appointed counsel who, other than in capital cases, are
kept on a short financial tether. Even the rare defendant who can afford to
hire counsel will normally be unable to match the resources that the govern-
ment can credibly threaten to pour into the case. The burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt is a partial offset (like the provision of counsel to
indigent defendants) to the inequality of the parties' resources for gathering
and presenting evidence. In an inquisitorial system, where the search is con-
ducted by a presumably disinterested judge, the need for a heavier burden of
proof in a criminal than in a civil system is attenuated.
A complicating factor is that prosecutors may be disinterested, since, un-
like private lawyers, their incomes are not tied directly to success in litiga-
tion. Economic theory, as well as common sense and observation, suggests,
however, that the desire to win, weighted by the stakes in the case (roughly,
the sentence if the defendant is convicted), is the most important argument in
the prosecutorial utility function. Prosecutors thus have incentives similar to
those of private lawyers. Being a prosecutor is rarely a terminal job; it is a
stepping stone. Future employers will evaluate a prosecutor by his success in
litigation, which will be seen as a function of his win rate weighted by the
opposition that he had to overcome in order to win. Opposition will usually
be greater the graver the offense charged.
59. In cities with a population of a million or more, the average budget of the local prosecu-
tor's office exceeds $25 million. See CAROL J. DEFRANCES & GREG W. STEADMAN, PROSECUT-
ORs IN STATE COURTS, 1996, at 1 (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, NCJ 170092,
July 1998). Annual appropriations for the offices of the U.S. Attorneys, which prosecute most
federal criminal cases, aggregate some $1 billion. See BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOvERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1999, at 594 app. (1998).
60. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME
THEORY AND THE LAW 183-84 (1994).
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Judges, when asked to express proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a
probability of guilt, generally pick a number between .75 and .90 (depending
on the judge), and jury quantifications are similar.61 These may seem
shockingly low figures, implying that as many as a quarter of the people
convicted of crime are innocent. Not so. The higher the crime rate in rela-
tion to prosecutorial resources, the more thoroughly prosecutors will screen
cases for easy ones to win, and these will tend to be drawn from the tail of
the distribution of suspects that contains the suspects who are most likely to
be guilty. The heavy burden of persuasion and the other procedural advan-
tages of criminal defendants increase the incentive of prosecutors to go after
the most guilty by making it difficult to convict a defendant (notwithstanding
the disparity in resources between the prosecuting authorities and all but the
wealthiest defendants) unless the case is one sided against him. If because of
prosecutorial screening only one percent of the persons prosecuted are inno-
cent, then even, if all are convicted, only one percent of convicted defendants
will be innocent. And that is an exaggeration. Not all persons who are
prosecuted are convicted, and it is normally much easier for an innocent de-
fendant to create enough doubt in the trier of fact to induce an acquittal.
Tight screening implies that some, perhaps many, guilty people are not
prosecuted and that most people who are prosecuted and acquitted are actu-
ally guilty. In the previous example, if a ten percent acquittal rate is as-
sumed, then ninety-nine percent of the defendants acquitted would actually
have been guilty if the probability of acquittal was random with respect to
innocence and ninety percent if all innocent defendants were acquitted.62
This implies that when crime rates rise faster than prosecutorial resources,
entailing an even finer mesh in the screening of cases to pursue, the proce-
dural advantages of defendants should be reduced by courts or legislatures if
society wants to maintain the same balance between the probabilities of con-
victing the innocent and of acquitting the guilty. This point suggests a possi-
ble nonideological basis for the Supreme Court's swing against the rights of
criminal defendants in the 1970s and 1980s. Had those rights been preserved
intact, the rise in crime rates in that era (which greatly exceeded the increase
in the number of prosecutions)63 would have had the paradoxical effect of
61. See THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS
201-04 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1989); JOSEPH L. GASTWIRTH, 2 STATISTICAL REASONING IN
LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: TORT LAW, EVIDENCE, AND HEALTH 700-02 (1988).
62. Of 10,000 defendants, 100 (1%) are assumed to be innocent. If 1000 are acquitted (10%)
and the probability of acquittal is the same regardless of innocence, then in that group of 1000, 1%
are innocent and therefore 99% guilty. If all 1000 innocents are acquitted, then 9000 of the acquit-
ted defendants must be guilty (90%). "[J]uries are not particularly good at evaluating eyewitness
testimony... If they return few erroneous convictions it is because they are given few opportuni-
ties to judge innocent defendants." Samuel R. Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification
and Proof of Guilt, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 395,432 (1987).
63. Between 1960 and 1996, the "crime index" compiled by the FBI and reported in the FBI's
annual Uniform Crime Reports grew more than fivefold. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVEST-
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making it easier for guilty defendants to avoid punishment. That in turn
would have reduced the expected cost of punishment, and so driven crime
rates even higher, unless there was an offsetting increase in the severity of
punishment for those (fewer) criminals who were caught and convicted.
The assumption in the preceding paragraph of crime rates rising faster
than prosecutorial resources suggests an alternative response to rising crime
rates to curtailing defendants' procedural rights: increasing prosecutorial
budgets. Courts could exert pressure on legislatures to do this by holding the
line on procedure and invalidating (as cruel and unusual) steep legislative
increases in the severity of criminal punishments. Legislatures would be
forced to choose between increasing prosecutorial budgets and higher crime
rates that would place additional pressure on the courts to relax procedural
safeguards. The courts chose not to play this game of chicken with federal
and state legislators.
Although the burden of persuasion is much lower in a civil case and
most plaintiffs do not operate with a resource constraint (thanks to contingent
fees), there is no reason to suppose that a higher fraction of civil than crimi-
nal cases are decided incorrectly. Burden of persuasion has less to do with
the number of errors than with the distribution of errors between sides. More
undeserving plaintiffs than undeserving prosecutors win, but fewer unde-
serving civil defendants than undeserving criminal defendants win. What
makes it likely that most cases, civil or criminal, are resolved correctly is
simply that it is usually cheaper to obtain persuasive evidence on the side of
truth. But a selection effect makes the overall accuracy of the system diffi-
cult to observe. The procedural system as a whole is more accurate than the
trial component of it, but it is the latter that is visible. One-sided cases are
more likely to be settled before trial, usually with little publicity, than are
toss-ups, 64 and so the latter are overrepresented on the trial docket, which is
highly visible. This is a reason that a criminal justice system that disfavors
plea bargaining (like the German) is bound to appear more accurate than our
system. 65 The more that plea bargaining is discouraged, the more one-sided
cases there are in the trial mix.
IGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 33 (1960) (reporting a rate of
1037.9 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants); FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 5 (1996) (reporting a rate of 5078.9 crimes per 100,000
inhabitants). During the same period federal criminal prosecutions grew by a third (see annual
reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts). For state criminal prosecu-
tions, there are data only from 1977. Between then and 1994, the number of prosecutions actually
declined slightly (as estimated by the Court Statistics Project of the National Center for State
Courts), a period during which the crime index was growing by a third. See STATE COURT
CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 34 tbl.13 (1977); STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS,
1995, at 137 tbl.7 (1995).
64. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litiga-
tion, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
65. Cf JOHN H. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 74 (1977).
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3. Statistical evidence.
a. The bus case.66
It is now generally recognized, even by the judiciary, that since all evi-
dence is probabilistic-there are no metaphysical certainties-evidence
should not be excluded merely because its accuracy can be expressed in ex-
plicitly probabilistic terms, as in the case of fingerprint and DNA evidence. 67
But courts are reluctant to take the next step and hold that, given the modest
burden of persuasion in civil cases, the explicit probability that the plaintiff's
essential evidence is true need only exceed fifty percent, however slightly.
Suppose that the plaintiff is hit by a bus, and it is known that fifty-one per-
cent of the buses on the road where the plaintiff was hit are owned by Bus
Company A and forty-nine percent by Company B. The plaintiff sues A and
asks for judgment on the basis of this statistic alone; he tenders no other evi-
dence. If the defendant also puts in no evidence, should a jury be allowed to
award judgment for the plaintiff? The law's answer is "no"68 and has so
much intuitive appeal that it has become Exhibit A in the case against using
Bayes' theorem, or mathematical probability generally (or perhaps any the-
ory of probability), to guide or interpret legal factfinding. The answer might,
moreover, seem to cast a cloud over the admissibility of any explicitly prob-
abilistic evidence. We can think of the civil burden of persuasion as requir-
ing posterior odds of a shade over one in favor of the plaintiff (say 1.048,
which is 51 to 49), because a tie goes to the defendant. If the prior odds are
assumed to be 1 to 1, on the theory that the jury begins hearing the evi-
dence-in our hypothetical case, the only evidence the jury hears is the evi-
dence concerning the percentage of buses of each company on the route in
question-without any notion of who has the better case, then the posterior
odds are equal to the likelihood ratio. This is 1.048 in the bus case, and since
66. For the most thorough discussion of this famous chestnut of modem evidence scholarship,
see Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability Enough?, 62 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 739 (1992). And for economic analysis of it on which I draw in part,
see Suzanne Scotchmer, Rules of Evidence and Statistical Reasoning in Court, in 3 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 389, 391-93 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Hannigan, 27 F.3d 890, 893 n.3 (3d Cir. 1994).
68. See Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics,
and Proof Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IoWA L. REv. 1001, 1050-51
(1988), and cases cited. The hypothetical case in the text is a variant of Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc.,
58 N.E.2d 754 (Mass. 1945), where the court held that it was not enough "that mathematically the
chances somewhat favor" the proposition that a bus of the defendant caused the accident See id. at
755 (quoting Sargent v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 29 N.E.2d 825, 827 (Mass. 1940)). Kaminsky
v. Hertz Corp., 288 N.W.2d 426 (Mich. App. 1979), is sometimes cited as being contrary to Smith,
but this is not an accurate reading. Quite apart from the fact that the corresponding percentages
were 90% and 10%, there was also nonstatistical evidence pointing to the defendant's ownership of
the truck that had caused the accident. My discussion of the bus hypothetical draws in part on my
opinion in Howard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 358 (7th Cir. 1998).
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it exceeds one, the plaintiff should win-a conclusion almost no legal pro-
fessional accepts.
The problem that causes this disbelief, however, is not with mathemati-
cal probability but with the tacit assumption that the statistic concerning the
ownership of the buses is the only evidence that the plaintiff can obtain.69 It
is the implausibility of this assumption that powers the intuition that the
plaintiff should lose. If the statistic is the plaintiffs only evidence, the infer-
ence to be drawn is not that there is a fifty-one percent probability that it was
a bus owned by A that hit the plaintiff but that the plaintiff either investigated
and discovered that it was actually a bus owned by B (and let us say that B is
judgment-proof and so not worth suing), or that he has simply not bothered
to conduct an investigation. If the first alternative is true, he should of
course lose; and since it may be true, the probability that the plaintiff was hit
by a bus owned by A is significantly less than fifty-one percent, and the
plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of production.
Even if the second alternative is true (the plaintiff simply did not bother
to investigate), he should lose. A court should not expend any of its scarce
resources of time and effort on a case until the plaintiff has conducted a suf-
ficient search to indicate that an expenditure of public resources is reasona-
bly likely to yield a significant social benefit. This is implicit in the decision
discussed earlier to place the burden of producing evidence on the plaintiff
rather than on the defendant. Suppose it would cost the court system
$10,000 to try even a barebones case. This expenditure would be worthless
from the standpoint of deterring accidents should it turn out that the bus was
owned by B. It makes sense for the court to require some advance investiga-
tion by the plaintiff in order to increase the probability that a commitment of
judicial resources would be worthwhile. And likewise if there is an external
benefit to "getting right" which bus company is responsible for the plaintiff's
injury, the law can increase the probability of getting it right by compelling
the plaintiff to do a more thorough investigation than it might be in his
strictly private interest to do.
If, however, the ratio of buses owned by A to those owned by B on the
route in question is much higher than 51 to 49, then the case against allowing
"naked" statistical evidence to carry the plaintiffs burden of production is
weakened. Even in the 51 to 49 case, if there is other evidence against A,
there is an argument for admitting the statistical evidence because the addi-
tional evidence, even if weak, will (rightly, under Bayes' theorem) affect the
factfinder's posterior odds.70 But as we shall see when we discuss Rule 403
69. Another problem, which I shall ignore (though it is relevant in showing the artificiality of
the example), is that the plaintiff must prove more than the ownership of the bus to obtain a judg-
ment-notably, he must prove that the accident was due to the bus company's negligence.
70. See Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Uncertain Evidence with Sir Thomas Bayes: A Note for
Teachers, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1987, at 155, 156-57.
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of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the probative value of the evidence may be
too slight in relation to its cost to be worth admitting.
Suppose both parties do conduct a thorough investigation yet are unable
to come up with any additional evidence bearing on the ownership of the
bus. There is no longer a basis for suspicion that the plaintiff really believes
that a bus owned by Company B hit him, or for punishing him for not having
investigated more. The case may seem no different from any other one tried
under the preponderance of the evidence standard in which the balance of
probabilities tilts only slightly in favor of the plaintiff. But there is a differ-
ence. Suppose the legal system can identify an entire class of cases in which
the balance of probabilities tilts as slightly in favor of the plaintiff as it does
in the bus case. If there are 1000 such cases, then allowing them to be tried
can be expected to yield 510 correct decisions (that is, 510 decisions in
which the defendant was in fact the injurer) and 490 incorrect ones, while not
allowing them to be tried can be expected to yield 490 correct decisions and
510 erroneous ones. The social benefits of the twenty additional correct de-
cisions that allowing the 1000 cases to be tried would produce-benefits in
more perfect deterrence of negligent accidents-would probably fall short of
the social cost of 1000 trials.
There is still another objection to allowing the bus case to go to the jury.
If B, though responsible in fact for almost half the accidents, is never held
liable and A is always held liable, A will have a big incentive to be careful
and B little or no incentive to be careful. As a result, over time, more than
half the accidents will be caused by B, increasing the error rate resulting
from allowing juries to base decisions on the ratio of the companies' buses
on the route in question. Eventually, A, having higher liability costs, will
probably withdraw from the route; the rule on burden of proof will have cre-
ated a monopoly!
b. Statistical significance.
Suspicion of purely statistical evidence is merited in the hypothetical bus
case. It is also but less justifiably reflected in suggestions that the result of a
statistical investigation should be given no weight in a trial unless the result
is statistically significant at the five percent level,71 meaning that the prob-
71. This is a common interpretation of Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S.
299, 311 n.17 (1977), and Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977), as noted without
endorsement in THOMAS R. IRELAND, STEPHEN M. HORNER, JAMES D. ROGERS, PATRICK A.
GAUGHAN, ROBERT R. TROUT & MICHAEL J. PIETrE, EXPERT ECONOMIC TESTIMONY: REFER-
ENCE GUIDES FOR JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS 237 (1998). See also Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston
Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 962 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Ottaviani v. State Univ. of New York, 875 F.2d
365, 372 (2d Cir. 1989); Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677, 684 n.5 (6th Cir. 1988). But the interpre-
tation is incorrect, as noted in Orley Ashenfelter & Ronald Oaxaca, The Economics of Discrimina-
tion: Economists Enter the Courtroom, 77 AM. ECON. REv. 321,323 (1987). For criticism of using
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ability that the investigation would have yielded this result even if the hy-
pothesis that it was trying to test was false is no greater than five percent.
The five percent test is a convention employed in academic research, though
not one to which the research community adheres rigidly. Social scientists
often report results that are significant only at the ten percent level. And if
the results are significant at the two percent or one percent level, the social
scientist will point out that these results are more robust than those that are
significant only at the five percent level; they are "highly significant" rather
than just "significant." There is no magic to the five percent criterion; to
excludefrom a trial statistical evidence that failed to reach the five percent
significance level would imply that eyewitness testimony, too, should be in-
admissible unless the probability that the testimony would have been given
even if the event testified to had not occurred was less than five percent.
What is true is that the higher the significance level of a statistical study,
the more reliable the study is as evidence; and the lower that level, the less
reliable it is. A low significance level may reflect an unsound method of
statistical estimation, an incorrect specification of the hypothesis being
tested, or the omission of relevant variables that if included would have
caused the hypothesis to be rejected. When any of these factors is present,
the same kind of suspicion should arise as in the bus case. But if the study
has been conducted responsibly and has withstood a hammering from the
opponent's expert, failure to reach the conventional five percent significance
level would not be a good reason for excluding the evidence just because a
social scientist who violated the conventions of his discipline by reporting
results that do not attain the conventional significance level might be consid-
ered untrustworthy. The five percent convention is rooted in considerations
that have no direct relevance to litigation, such as the need to ration pages in
scientific journals. 72 And fears that jurors are dazzled by evidence which
involves explicit probability estimates, and so give such evidence more
weight than a good Bayesian would do, appear to be unfounded; jurors ap-
pear to give statistical evidence less weight that they should.73
significance levels as criteria of admissibility, see Richard Lempert, Statistics in the Courtroom:
Building on Rubinfeld, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1098, 1098-1103 (1985), and see generally DAvID L.
FAIGMAN, DAVID H. KAYE, MICHAEL J. SAKS & JOSEPH SANDERS, 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 118-21 (1997).
72. A similar point is made in an emerging economic literature on clinical trials and other so-
cial experiments: benefits from adherence to statistical conventions (randomization, sample size,
significance, and so on) must be traded off against costs. See, e.g., Tomas Philipson, The Evalua-
tion of New Health Care Technology: The Labor Economics of Statistics, 76 J. ECONOMETRICS 375
(1997).
73. See Brian C. Smith, Steven D. Penrod, Amy L. Otto & Roger C. Park, Jurors' Use of
Probabilistic Evidence, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 49 (1996). Wells attributes this to a cognitive
quirk and suggests that it might be offset by a redescription of statistical evidence. See Wells, supra
note 66, at 748-50. He states, with reference to a paternity suit in which blood tests showed a
99.8% probability that the defendant was indeed the father, that "one suspects that the plaintiff
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One must not overlook the cost of weak statistical evidence. The less
robust the results of a statistical study offered as evidence, the more time will
have to be spent at trial exploring the design of the study. Given the diffi-
culty that judges and jurors have in understanding and weighing statistical
evidence, there is an argument (akin to that for the hearsay rule) for exclud-
ing statistical evidence that the relevant profession, for whatever reason, con-
siders weak.
4. The product rule.
Another feature of the mathematical theory of probability that has drawn
fire from evidence professors also relates to the burden of persuasion. This
is the rule that the probability that two or more independent events is true is
the product of the probabilities that each of them is true. For example, the
probability of coming up with heads on three consecutive fair tosses is .125
(.5 x .5 x .5). This leads to the paradox emphasized by Ronald Allen that the
standard burden of proof instruction to a jury in a civil case, at least if taken
literally, will often imply that the jury should find in favor of the plaintiff
even if the probability that his claim is valid is much less than .5.74 The jury
will be instructed to render a verdict for the plaintiff if it is satisfied that he
has proved each of the elements of his claim by a preponderance of the evi-
dence even if the elements are independent that is, their probabilities are un-
correlated. It is as if the court were telling the jury, that as soon as it finds
one element proved by a preponderance of the evidence, it should assume
that that element has been proved to a certainty. In other words, the jurors
are being told to be bad mathematicians! In the simple case in which the
plaintiff, to prove his case (C), must prove just two elements (A and B), and
the burden of persuasion is proof by a preponderance of the evidence, and
the elements are both independent and equiprobable, so that p(C) = p(A) x
p(B) and p(A) = p(B), then for the plaintiff actually to carry his burden of
persuasion (p(C) > .5) the jury would have to find p(A) =p(B) > .707, that is,
that the probability of each element exceeds .707, not, as it will be instructed,
.5.
But perhaps the real function of the instruction is different: to indicate to
the jury that a chain of inferences cannot be stronger than its weakest link.
Even if the plaintiff has proved the defendant's negligence to a certainty, if
the probability that the defendant's negligence caused the injury of which the
plaintiff is complaining is .5 or less the plaintiff should still lose, since cau-
would have won the suit if the expert had refaiamed his testimony to say that 'based on a blood test
that is 99.8% accurate, I conclude that the defendant is the father' rather than 'based on a blood test,
there is a 99.8% probability that the defendant is the father."' Id. at 749.
74. See Ronald I Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 409-20
(1991); Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401,405-08 (1986).
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sation is an essential element of the negligence tort. As in this example,
moreover, the number of elements of the plaintiffs claim is, except for
purely formal requirements, rarely more than two, and the two are rarely in-
dependent.
Most important, as Allen points out, the realistic benchmark for evaluat-
ing the plaintiffs case is not the null hypothesis but the defendant's case.
Suppose, in a case in which the plaintiff's case has two elements-that a per-
son hit him and that the person was the defendant's employee, elements
which are independent of each other-the jury reckons the probability of the
first element at .6 and of the second at .7, for a joint probability of .42. This
still leaves the question: What did happen? Did the plaintiff fabricate his
claim? Was he injured, but by someone else? If the injurer was not the de-
fendant's employee, what was his status? Mulling over these questions, the
jury may rationally conclude that the plaintiffs story, even though it has
doubtful features, is more plausible than the alternative story told by the de-
fendant, and therefore that the plaintiff should win. This was Hume's argu-
ment against miracles.75 No doubt it was unlikely that the laws of nature
could explain the phenomena attested as miraculous. But it was even less
likely that the laws of nature had been suspended in these cases; to put it dif-
ferently, it was more likely that the witnesses of the alleged miracles were
lying or mistaken. Thus, as we might put it, the naturalists had proved their
case by a preponderance of the evidence. Notice, however, that in Hume's
case there were only two possibilities: Either the alleged miracles were
miracles, or they were not. In a legal case, the plaintiff might tell one-story
(the story that if true shows that he should win the case), the defendant might
tell another, less probable story, and yet there might also be additional possi-
ble stories. If the plaintiff's story had a probability of .42 of being true, the
defendant's story a probability of .30 of being true, and the probability that
another story or stories is true was .28, then the plaintiff should lose because
he has failed to prove that his story is more likely than not true.
Nothing in the mathematical theory of probability forbids working
backwards from a joint probability to individual probabilities. After consid-
ering all the alternatives, the jury might be quite confident that an employee
of the defendant hit the plaintiff. Suppose the jury reckoned that joint prob-
ability at .7. If one pointed out to the members of the jury that they could not
have come to this conclusion consistently with reckoning the individual
probabilities at .7 and .6, they would quickly be led to recalculate those
probabilities. They would say something like, "Until we considered the case
75. See DAVID HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING § 10, pt.1
(Charles W. Hendel ed., Liberal Arts Press 1955) (1748); see also William Kruskal, Miracles and
Statistics: The Casual Assumption of Independence, 83 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 929 (1988) (emphasiz-
ing the importance to a proper evaluation of Hume's thesis of whether the testimony of the various
witnesses to miracles was independent).
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as a whole we didn't realize how much more likely than not it was that the
plaintiff was indeed hit and that the person who hit him was indeed the de-
fendant's employee."
This discussion bears also on the criticism that Bayes' theorem does not
recognize that the weight and completeness of the evidence bearing on a hy-
pothesis, and not just the odds that we might give on its correctness if we are
betting folk, are important to people's judgments. 76 In fact, weak evidence
and missing evidence do affect the odds that a person would be willing to
give that some hypothesis was correct. In the bus case, for example, it would
be reckless to give odds of 51 to 49 that the plaintiff was hit by a bus owhed
by Company A if there were no other evidence beyond the bare statistic. The
failure of the plaintiff to come up with any other evidence would give rise to
an inference that it was actually B's bus that struck the plaintiff, that the
plaintiff knows this, and that he has sued A only because B is judgment-
proof. Here it should be mentioned that one does not have to be a gambler to
be interested in odds. A nongambler deciding whether to undergo an opera-
tion will be interested in the odds of the operation's success. Or maybe this
example shows that we are all gamblers in a sense.
5. The biased factfinder and the peremptory challenge.
The significance of Bayes' theorem for thinking about the law of evi-
dence is mainly as a reminder that estimating probability is a useful and ra-
tional way of dealing with uncertainty, that one should update one's esti-
mates as new information flows in, and that the impact of new information
on one's ultimate conclusion depends on one's prior odds-that is, on the
probability that one estimated before beginning to consider evidence. The
last point suggests a possible way of thinking about "bias" as a ground for
excusing a prospective juror or recusing a judge. Ideally we want the trier of
fact to work from prior odds of 1 to 1 that the plaintiff or prosecutor has a
meritorious case. A substantial departure from this position, in either direc-
tion, marks the trier of fact as biased. This has the bad effects that I dis-
cussed earlier in reference to the judge who has strong prior odds in a system
in which judges rather than juries make the decisions. Although bias is
clearest when the judge or jury not only has a prior belief about the proper
outcome of the case but also holds the belief unshakably-that is, refuses to
update it on the basis of evidence-it is not a complete response to a charge
of bias that the judge or juror has an "open mind" in the sense of being will-
ing to adjust his probability estimate in the light of the evidence presented at
76. The philosopher L. Jonathan Cohen has made this criticism a number of times. See, eg.,
L. Jonathan Cohen, The Role of Evidential Weight in Criminal Proof, in PROBABILITY AND INFER-
ENCE IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: THE UsES AND LIMITs OF BAYESIANISM 113 (Peter Tillers & Eric
D. Green eds., 1988).
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the trial. Any rational person will do that. (What I just called the "clearest
case" of bias is thus a case of irrational bias.) His prior odds, if he is a Baye-
sian, will still have an influence on his posterior odds and hence (at least in a
close case-an important qualification for reasons explained earlier) on his
decision.
This discussion implies that inquisitorial systems will be less concerned
with bias than adversarial ones. If the judge dominates the search for evi-
dence, the problem that his strong (albeit accurate) prior odds would discour-
age search by the lawyers and so eventually make his prior odds less accurate
by reducing the flow of relevant information to him is less serious, because
the role of the lawyers in the search process is smaller.
In evaluating bias, one must distinguish between prior beliefs about the
proper outcome of the case and prior beliefs about the factfinding process
itself-prior beliefs that constitute "common sense," such as the belief that
witnesses are likely to shade evidence to make themselves look good. The
ideal factfinder is not a tabula rasa; he simply reserves judgment on whether
the plaintiff or defendant in this particular case should win. But even if im-
partiality thus means only lacking a belief prior to hearing evidence in the
case about the outcome of the case, it still has a downside: ignorance and
inexperience. The problem is particularly serious in the case of trial by jury.
The strength of the jury system, constituting at least a partial offset to jurors'
lack of expertise in adjudication, is its pooling of persons of diverse experi-
ence and perspective. When lawyers for both sides are free (as they are) to
use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors who seem predisposed in favor
of the opposing party, the epistemic diversity of the jury is impaired.77 De-
liberation might be fostered if the system, instead of striving to have jurors
whose prior odds in favor of the plaintiff are 1 to 1, created balanced panels
of jurors having equal but opposite odds in favor of (and against) the plain-
tiff. But this seems infeasible. Alternatives include reducing the number of
peremptory challenges and increasing the size of the jury.
C. Judge versus Jury; or, What Is a Fact?
A judge, whether the trial judge or an appellate judge, obviously has a
comparative advantage over a jury when it comes to deciding questions of
law. But the line between a question of fact and a question of law is not al-
ways clear. Negligence is a legal concept; but is the question whether the
defendant was negligent a legal or a factual question? The answer usually
given is that it is both or neither and is perhaps best described as a "mixed"
question of law and fact or a question about the application of a legal concept
77. See Edward P. Schwartz & Warren F. Schwartz, The Challenge of Peremptory Chal-
lenges, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 325 (1996).
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to a set of facts. I believe, on the contrary, that it is a pure question of fact,
and so the law is right to leave it to the jury subject to the same deferential
review as other factual determinations that juries make. This is most easily
seen when the concept of negligence is expressed in the terms of the Hand
formula.78 The defendant is negligent if B < PL, that is, if the burden (cost)
of avoiding the accident was less than the cost of the accident (L for loss)
discounted (multiplied) by the probability that the accident would have oc-
curred had the burden of avoidance been shouldered. Each determination
required to apply the formula is factual rather than legal in character: esti-
mating B, P, and L, multiplying P and L, and determining whether PL is
larger than B. No legal knowledge is required to make any of these determi-
nations (as would be the case if the jury were asked to decide what negli-
gence is), which when made answer the question whether the defendant was
negligent. I believe, but will not try to demonstrate here, that most other
"mixed" questions of law and fact, such as possession, voluntariness, and
good faith, could similarly be decomposed into pure questions of fact.
III. THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
The Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted by Congress in 1975 and since
amended from time to time (most recently in 1998), together with the Notes
of the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, constitute a compen-
dious as well as authoritative guide to the modem law of evidence. I shall
use these rules79 as the skeleton of my further discussion of evidence law,
skipping however a number of the less important or less problematic provi-
sions. For example, Rule 201, involving judicial notice of incontestable facts
(that is, no evidence is required to prove the obvious), is important, but it is
obviously sound as a matter of economics as well as common sense: Evi-
dence of what is obvious would involve some cost and yield no benefit.80
Rule 301, dealing with presumptions, is important and nonobvious, but it
need not be discussed here because of my earlier discussion of the McDon-
nell Douglas rule.81
78. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.);
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 15, at 85-88.
79. They are published, together with the Advisory Committee Notes and excerpts from the
congressional history, as Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, in FED. Civ.
JUD. P. & R. 340. The rules apply to criminal as well as civil cases, and so are published in West's
Federal Criminal Code & Rules as well. For text plus helpful commentary, see also SECTION OF
LITIGATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, EMERGING PROBLEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1998). Although the rules govern only federal court proceedings, the rules of
evidence used by state courts are similar and indeed often identical.
80. See FED. R. EVID. 201.
81. See FED. R. EVID. 301.
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Besides these omissions from the present discussion, it is important to
note that the formal rules codify only a fraction of the law of evidence.
Some of the most important rules, being limited to particular fields of sub-
stantive law, are classified as parts of their substantive fields rather than as
parts of the law of evidence. Examples from tort law include the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, the awarding of damages for loss of a chance (eliding in-
tractable issues of proof), and (to the same end) rules allocating liability
among negligent defendants when the causal contribution of each cannot be
determined. Examples from contract law include the parol evidence and
"four comers" rules, as well as the statute of frauds, all designed to reduce
the number of intractable credibility issues in trials for breach of contract.
Likewise affecting the evidentiary process are the laws punishing perjury,
which are classified with criminal law rather than evidence law, and statutes
of limitations, which reduce the likelihood that questions concerning events
in the distant past will have to be answered at trial. Of particular importance
in criminal trials today, the federal sentencing guidelines direct the sentenc-
ing judge, in cases in which the defendant testifies, to impose additional
punishment (for obstruction of justice) if the judge determines that the de-
fendant perjured himself.
The evidentiary rules embedded in tort and contract law, the imposition
of criminal sanctions for perjury and obstruction of justice, and statutes of
limitations show, incidentally, that the law is not entirely naive about the
ability of judges and juries to resolve credibility issues. In most cases, as the
law recognizes, there are no completely reliable methods of determining
whether a witness is testifying truthfully. A witness may be a good actor, in
the sense of a person able to create the appearance of honesty, or a good liar,
in the sense of a person able to weave a plausible and internally consistent
fiction, or both. Judges and juries are easily fooled by good liars.8 2
A. Harmless Error
Rule 103(a) provides (among other things) that a ruling admitting or ex-
cluding evidence cannot be made the basis of a motion for a new trial or of
reversal on appeal "unless a substantial right of the party [against whom the
ruling went] is affected. '83 In other words, harmless errors will be over-
looked. The harmless error doctrine is not limited to evidentiary rulings, but,
partly because such rulings are so frequent in a trial, they are common candi-
dates for harmless error treatment. More important, judgments of harmless-
ness depend on assumptions about the understanding of the trier of fact.
82. See Michael J. Saks, Enhancing and Restraining Accuracy in Adjudication, 51 L. &
CONTENT. PROBS. 243,263-64 (1988).
83. FED. R. EvmD. 301(a).
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Harmless error plays a particularly important role in criminal appeals,
and they will be the focus of my discussion. Because most criminal defen-
dants do not pay for their lawyer, they will appeal their conviction or sen-
tence even if the probability of reversal is slight; although the expected bene-
fits of appealing may be slight, the expected costs are zero. Minor errors
therefore figure prominently in criminal appeals, and this makes clear the
need for a doctrine of harmless error to head off remands that would be all
costs and no benefits. But despite the common-sense (and economic) appeal
of the harmless error principle, it may often confer an undeserved, or at least
unintended, advantage on prosecutors. 84 The rule is biased in their favor be-
cause the appellate court, not having witnessed the trial (and, especially, not
having observed the jury), lacks good information for assessing the likeli-
hood that the errors affected the outcome. The appellate court perforce as-
sesses the likely effect of the errors on the average jury, whereas the prose-
cutor may know that the jury in a particular case has an above average pro-
pensity to acquit. The result is that he may have to manipulate the jury's
emotions if he is to secure a conviction. So an error may look harmless to
the appellate court yet actually have been harmful. Moreover, it takes a
highly disciplined judge to vote to reverse a conviction when he thinks the
defendant is guilty, even if he acknowledges to himself that the defendant
might have been acquitted but for an error at trial and so is entitled by law to
a new trial.
The foregoing analysis can be formalized as follows. Let p be the prob-
ability of conviction; a the probability of affirmance given conviction (the
prosecutor is assumed to be unable to appeal, and the defendant is assumed
to appeal in every case in which there is a conviction), so that 1 - a is the
probability of reversal; b the benefit to the prosecutor or prosecution-minded
judge of a conviction; c the cost of a trial to the prosecutor (for simplicity,
assume that the cost to him of defending an appeal by the defendant is
zero-it will in fact usually be quite low relative to the cost of trial); x the set
of tactics that involve violating procedural and evidentiary rules that favor
the defense;85 and y the other inputs into getting a conviction. Increases in x
and y increase p, the probability of conviction; increases in x also decrease a,
the probability that a conviction will be affirmed; increases in y also increase
C.
84. For a more complete treatment, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Harmless
Error (Nov. 19, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law Review). As a prac-
tical matter, only prosecutors benefit from the rule in criminal cases, because appeals by prosecutors
are so rare.
85. Perhaps the most common such tactic is inviting (without actually asking-that would be
reversible error) the jury to infer the defendant's guilt from his failure to take the stand. Notice that
this "abuse" is an artifact of the existence of the privilege against being forced to incriminate one-
self-a privilege that, as we shall see, is not easy to justify on economic or other grounds.
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If the prosecutor employs x tactics, there are three possible states of the
world: conviction followed by affirmance; conviction followed by reversal
followed by a retrial at which, we can assume, the variables are as they
would have been in the first trial if x = 0; and acquittal, which generates no
gain to the prosecutor and leaves him with a net loss measured by c. The
prosecutor's net expected gain (G) when he employs x is therefore the sum of
his gain if there is an affirmed conviction (p(xy)b - c(xy)), his gain if there
is a reversed conviction followed by a retrial (p(xy)(p(y)b - c(y)), and his
gain if there is acquittal (0 - c(xy)), with the first gain being discounted by
the probability of affirmance (a) and the second by the probability of reversal
(1 -a). Thus,
G= a(x)(p(xy)b - c(xy)) +p(xy)(l - a(x))(p(y)b - c()) -c(xy). (6)
(The reason that p and c in the reversal-retrial state of the world are not
shown as functions ofx is that by assumption x = 0 in that state.)
The effect of x (abusive tactics) on G is complex. It raises G by in-
creasing the probability of a conviction but lowers it by increasing the prob-
ability of a reversal of the conviction and by increasing the prosecutor's
costs. We cannot exclude the possibility that the net effect is to increase G.
The possibility is increased if we consider the substitutability of x for y (of
violating procedural or evidentiary rules for other inputs into obtaining a
conviction). For then the effect of using abusive tactics, while it includes as
before reducing the probability of a conviction that will stick and thus in-
creasing the likelihood of having to incur the cost of a second trial (c(y)), is
also to reduce the cost of the first trial. This is an additional reason to be-
lieve that if the effect of the abusive tactics in reducing the probability that
the defendant's conviction will be affirmed is low because of the harmless
error rule, the rule encourages deliberate error by the prosecution. It is espe-
cially likely to do so if the substitution effect of x on y is large-that is, if the
abusive tactics are a cheap and effective substitute for legitimate forensic
tactics.
Even if the doctrine of harmless error thus invites prosecutors to commit
deliberate errors, this might be efficient if prosecutors committed such errors
only when faced with a jury irrationally prone to acquit. That might indeed
be the consequence of the doctrine if appellate courts were omniscient, for
then they would forgive prosecutorial errors if but only if the defendant was
in fact guilty. If, however, the appellate court cannot tell whether the defen-
dant really is guilty, if all it knows is whether an average jury would have
convicted the defendant had it not been for the errors, then the prosecutor
may have an incentive to use deliberate errors to convict the innocent. How
great an incentive one does not know; it depends on the weight of purely ca-
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reerist ambitions in prosecutorial utility functions. To be on the safe side,
one might wish to modify the doctrine of harmless error to exclude from its
operation deliberate errors committed or induced by prosecutors and make
these cause for automatic reversal.
B. Limiting Instructions
Federal Rule of Evidence 105 directs the judge to instruct the jury to
limit its consideration of evidence admissible for one purpose (or against one
party) but not for another. The assumption is that although the jury heard the
inadmissible evidence, it is capable of disregarding it if instructed to do so.
The assumption is not always indulged. For example, if the admissibility of
a confession is contested, the issue must be heard outside the jury's pres-
ence,86 since if the confession were to be ruled inadmissible the jurors could
not be expected to put it out of their minds in deciding whether the defendant
was guilty. But in general, limiting instructions are deemed efficacious, not
only in the circumstances with which Rule 105 deals but also when used to
"cure" the erroneous or inadvertent admission of inadmissible evidence: The
judge tells the jury to disregard it.
Empirical evidence as well as common sense suggests that courts exag-
gerate the efficacy of limiting instructions. 87 A limiting instruction is likely
to be ineffectual unless the judge is able to explain why, as with certain types
of hearsay, the evidence is not probative. If it is probative (or emotionally
compelling),88 though inadmissible, the limiting instruction is more likely to
rivet the jurors' attention to the evidence than to persuade them to disregard
it, even if the judge explains the basis for the instruction.89 For this reason,
lawyers often will not request a limiting instruction even when they are enti-
tled to one. In a criminal trial, the deemed but doubtful efficacy of limiting
instructions operates in conjunction with the doctrine of harmless error to
encourage prosecutors to resort to abusive tactics if they fear that acquittal is
otherwise likely. The likeliest response to an improper question or comment
is neither a mistrial nor a reversal but an impotent limiting instruction.
There is, it is true, a difference between belief and acceptance. Belief is
involuntary-telling someone not to believe something without giving him a
reason why it is not credible will not alter his beliefs; that is the basis of
86. See FED. R. EVID. 104(c).
87. See Saks, supra note 7, at 26, and studies cited therein.
88. The standard example is a gruesome photograph of a murder victim. On the capacity of
such photographs to prejudice the jury's consideration of the logically distinct issue of guilt, see
generally Kevin S. Douglas, David R. Lyon & James R.P. Ogloff, The Impact of Graphic Photo-
graphic Evidence on Mock Jurors' Decisions in a Murder Trial: Probative or Prejudicial?, 21
LAW. & HuM. BEHAV. 485 (1997).
89. For evidence, see Keri L. Pickel, Inducing Jurors to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A
Legal Explanation Does Not Help, 19 LAW. & HUM. BEHAV. 407,422-23 (1995).
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skepticism about limiting instructions. But antiskeptics might argue that one
can refuse to act on a belief. You might believe the defendant guilty yet ac-
cept that he should be acquitted because you don't believe it with the requi-
site degree of certitude.90 In other words, burden of persuasion is properly
regarded as involving acceptance rather than belief. The prior odds, the
posterior odds, and the likelihood ratios created by particular pieces of evi-
dence are all matters of belief; but what posterior odds are necessary to give
the victory to plaintiff or defendant is a matter of acceptance. This is a dis-
tinction that jurors should be able to understand.
The problem with using the distinction between belief and acceptance to
rehabilitate the limiting instruction is that, when a jury is deliberating, it is
very difficult for it to disregard inadmissible evidence and base judgment
only on admissible evidence, even if it wants to. If jurors were explicit Bay-
esians and calculated likelihood ratios for each bit of evidence, they could
disregard evidence that they had heard but been told to ignore. They do not
proceed in this fashion but instead assess evidence intuitively. They cannot
be expected to determine the posterior odds on the basis of less than all the
evidence they heard, and posterior odds are founded on belief rather than on
acceptance.
When the ineffectuality of limiting instructions is pointed out, judges
tend to respond that the jury system presupposes that jurors obey the judge's
instructions.91 By this the judges seem to mean that the jury system would
have to be abandoned if the presupposition were acknowledged to be incor-
rect. That is untrue. The jury system presupposes some degree of compli-
ance by jurors with the rules laid down by the judge to guide them, but not
100 percent. Perfect compliance with rules is rarely attained in any depart-
ment of life and is particularly unlikely in the case of an ad hoc body that has
only weak incentives to comply-jurors are neither penalized for bad per-
formance nor rewarded for good. It is not even clear that jurors pay much
attention to the instructions on the law, as opposed to instructions to disre-
gard particular evidence. Yet, as we saw earlier, such lack of attention need
not fatally undermine the rationality of the jury system.
90. See L. JONATHAN COHEN, AN ESSAY ON BELIEF AND ACCEPTANCE 117-25 (1992).
91. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9 (1985) (A "crucial assumption underlying
our constitutional system of trial by jury [is) that jurors carefully follow instructions."); Opper v.
United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954) ("Our theory of trial relies upon the ability of ajury to follow
instructions."); United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 884 (10th Cir. 1998) ("A central assumption
of our jurisprudence is that juries follow the instructions they receive."). Not all judges fool them-
selves. Learned Hand, for example, called the limiting instruction "the recommendation to the jury
of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody's else." Nash v. United
States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932). Occasionally courts concede the ineffectuality of a lim-
iting instruction. See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968) (reversing conviction
where jury was permitted to consider a codefendant's confession that implicated the defendant).
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C. Relevance
The Federal Rules of Evidence define relevance as "having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."92 The rules make relevant evidence admissible and irrelevant
evidence inadmissible,93 but relevant evidence "may be excluded if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."94
These rules make economic sense. In Bayesian terms (and well illustrating
the heuristic value of Bayes' theorem for understanding the law of evidence),
evidence is relevant if its likelihood ratio is different from one and irrelevant
if it is one.95 Irrelevant evidence so defined has zero social benefits, though
it may confer a private benefit on one side of the lawsuit by confusing or
prejudicing the jury.
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 401 point out that evidence can
be relevant even though it bears on an undisputed fact, because it may help to
make the fact clear and thus assist in establishing correct likelihood ratios. If
a relevant fact is unclear, though undisputed, the jury may not assign it the
proper weight in its deliberations. A related point, borrowed from signaling
theory, is that a certain amount of redundancy may increase rather than re-
duce the intelligibility of a communication. 96
Rule 403, in requiring an explicit comparison of benefit and cost, is cen-
tral to an economic analysis of the law of evidence in much the same way
that the Hand formula is central to the economic analysis of the law of torts.
It sets forth a cost-benefit formula for deciding the most common question in
the law of evidence-whether to admit or exclude evidence. It bears the
same relation to Equation (4) (-p S = C),97 the economic formula for the op-
timal amount of evidence, as the Hand formula does to the economic formula
for the optimal amount of care (-p.L = c). 98 The cost-benefit formula im-
92. FED. R. EVID. 401.
93. See FED. R. EVID. 402.
94. FED. R. EVID. 403.
95. See Richard Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1021, 1025-26 (1977).
96. See ScHUM, supra note 6, at 443.
97. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
98. I have relabeled D as L and A as c, in LANDES & POSNER, supra note 15, at 60 eq. 3.9, to
highlight the isomorphism of the formula for the optimal amount of care with Equation (4). For
mention of the cost-benefit interpretation of Rule 403, see Louis Kaplow, The Theoretical Founda-
tion of the Hearsay Rules, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1786, 1789 (1980). See also Thomas Gibbons &
Allan C. Hutchinson, The Practice and Theory of Evidence Law-A Note, 2 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
119, 122-23 (1982).
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plicit in Rule 403 also can be used to evaluate particular rules of evidence, 99
just as the Hand formula is used in economic analysis of law as a standard
for evaluating specific rules of tort law. Rule 403 does, it is true, place a
thumb on the scale ("substantially outweighed"), °0 but this may be neces-
sary to prevent the judge from taking over the factfinding task from the jury
by excluding evidence that favors the side the judge thinks should lose.
Rule 403 is not as carefully drafted as it could be. It runs together three
distinct grounds for excluding relevant evidence: (1) emotionality (one
source of "unfair prejudice" and of "misleading the jury"), (2) cognitive
overload ("confusion" and other forms of "misleading the jury"), and (3)
"waste of time" (which seems synonymous with "undue delay" and "need-
less presentation of cumulative evidence"). 10 1 At first glance, the grounds I
have numbered (1) and (2) relate to the cognitive limitations of the trier of
fact and so go to the benefits of the evidence in determining truth, while the
third goes to cost, the right-hand side of Equations (1) through (4). This
characterization is not precise. To begin with, two distinct types of cognitive
limitation should be distinguished. The first, often called "bounded rational-
ity," arises because people do not have zero costs of absorbing and analyzing
information and so encounter problems of overload. This type of cognitive
limitation is entirely consistent with rationality, which does not presuppose
zero costs of acquiring and processing information. The second type of cog-
nitive limitation, however, is the domain of the cognitive illusions and emo-
tional distractions, the domain of irrational thinking. Ground (1) (what I
have called emotionality) corresponds to this second type of cognitive limi-
tation, and ground (2) (cognitive overload) corresponds to the first. Keeping
evidence from the jury is an alternative to what might otherwise be time-
consuming and ineffectual efforts at enlarging and debiasing the jury's cog-
nitive capacities.
Another way to think about this function of Rule 403 (and to conceptu-
alize the rules of evidence generally) is as a corrective to the jury's lack of
incentive to overcome its cognitive limitations by "thinking hard" about the
issues that it is asked to resolve. Jurors have no monetary incentives to
weigh evidence carefully: By screening from them evidentiary materials that
would make their job even more difficult and thus require them to exert
greater uncompensated mental efforts without any compensation, the rules of
evidence reduce the jurors' costs and so improve their product.
Ground (2) also interacts with (3) (waste of time): Repetition and pro-
traction can make it harder for the trier of fact to reach a correct judgment, as
99. This was essentially Bentham's approach. He thought that there should be no rules of
evidence, but that in particular cases the judge should be allowed to exclude particular items of
evidence on grounds of "vexation, expense, and delay." BENTHAM, supra note 19, at I.
100. FED. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added).
101. Id.
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well as increase the direct costs of the trial. As more and more evidence is
introduced, additional evidence, even if relevant, is likely both to be wasteful
in the sense of yielding diminishing benefits (in terms of accuracy) with no
corresponding diminution in cost and confusing in the sense of actually re-
ducing accuracy.
This point suggests that the optimal length of a jury trial may in most
cases be quite short, because the benefits of additional evidence are likely to
decline at an accelerating rate while the costs are constant or even rising, as
the litigants cast further and further afield. To help see this, we can modify
Equation (1) to allow the amount of evidence (x) to have both a positive and
a negative effect on the probability of a true result, as in
B(x) =p(bix - b2x2)S- c(x) (7)
where b, measures the effect of a unit of x in increasing the accuracy of the
trial and b2 its effect in decreasing that accuracy by confusing or overloading
the jury. Equation (7) assumes that the latter effect will increase at an in-
creasing rate with increases in the amount of evidence (hence the squaring of
x). Depending on the values of b, and b2, adding evidence may, beyond
some point, actually diminish accuracy and thus reduce efficiency, even if
the additional evidence is costless. Alternatively, confusion and overload
could be considered indirect costs that increase with the amount of evidence,
in which event the last term in Equation (1) (c(x)) might be approximated by
CdX + cix 2, where cd is the direct costs of the evidence and ci the indirect
costs.
Evidence that is cumulative must be distinguished, however, from evi-
dence necessary to complete a mosaic of proof. A costly bit of "additional"
evidence might be cost-justified because it fits in with other evidence to es-
tablish the truth convincingly.
By excluding irrelevant-and also relevant but on balance unhelpful-
evidence, Rules 402 and 403 counteract the incentive of the parties in some
cases to overinvest in evidence from a social standpoint. We should expect
these rules to be invoked most often in big-money cases, for it is in such
cases that the risk of overinvestment is greatest. This suggests a possible
direction for empirical research.
D. Character Evidence
The subsequent rules in Article 4 of the Federal Rules of Evidence par-
ticularize the general standard of Rule 403 with reference to recurrent issues.
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The first of these rules, Rule 404,102 excludes (with various exceptions)103
evidence of a person's character when used to show that he probably acted
"in character" on the occasion involved in the litigation. The principal con-
sequence is to exclude evidence that a criminal defendant has a criminal rec-
ord (unless, as we shall see, he testifies). Such evidence is relevant, because
a person who has committed a crime in the past has by doing so indicated a
propensity to violate the criminal laws. It is only weakly probative, because
repeat offenders are punished more heavily than first-time offenders in part
precisely to offset any greater propensity to commit crimes that their previ-
ous convictions have revealed. If recidivists are punished severly enough,
the propensity to commit a subsequent offense may be reduced to the same
level as the propensity to commit a first offense.
The principal concern with this class of evidence, however, is not lack of
probative value. It is the danger that a jury will give such evidence too much
weight, or more likely that it will convict on insufficient evidence believing
that it does not much matter whether the defendant is innocent of the par-
ticular crime for which he is being tried since he is a member of the criminal
class and probably has committed other crimes for which he has not been
punished.
The Rule 404 exclusion is somewhat porous, though. For one thing, evi-
dence of prior crimes may be used to prove facts other than propensity, such
as motive, absence of mistake, or modus operandi.104 If, for example, the
defendant were being tried for the murder of a witness who had been respon-
sible for the defendant's earlier conviction, that conviction would be admis-
sible to prove the defendant's motive for committing the present crime.
There is also a blanket exception allowing the admission of prior-crimes evi-
dence when the defendant is charged with rape or child sexual molestation
and the prior crimes involved similar acts.105 The exception may have an
economic rationale-most clearly in the molestation case-that is closely
related to the motive exception in Rule 404(b). Most people do not have a
desire to sexually molest children. Between two suspects, only one of whom
has a history of such molestation, the history establishes a motive that en-
ables the two suspects to be distinguished; prior-crimes evidence is admissi-
ble to prove motive. Unlike a molester, a thief, unless he is a kleptomaniac,
does not have an overwhelming desire to steal. Theft is merely instrumental
to his desire for money, and there are many substitute instruments. Commit-
ting a prior theft does not show that a defendant "likes" theft and so does not
102. FED. R. EVID. 404.
103. Most of the rules contain exceptions. This qualification should be borne in mind
throughout, because I will not repeat it.
104. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
105. See FED. R. EVID. 413, 414; cf. FED. P, EVID. 415 (addressing admissibility of evidence
about prior sexual assault or child molestation in civil litigation).
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furnish a motive for his committing the current theft with which he is
charged.
It has been argued that a rational juror, aware of the inadmissibility of
prior-crimes evidence and so knowing that he will not find out whether the
defendant is a habitual or first-time offender, will assume that that there is
some probability greater than zero but less than one that the defendant is in-
deed a habitual offender. As a result, he will underestimate the guilt of the
habitual offender and overestimate that of the first-time offender.10 6 The as-
sumption that jurors behave in such a way is unrealistic, and the scholars
who support this theory present no evidence that it is, nevertheless, correct.
Their better point is that if prior-crimes evidence were freely admissible, and
jurors were highly prone to convict habitual offenders whether or not the
evidence established their guilt, deterrence would be undermined. The ex-
pected cost of punishing habitual offenders would fall, because that cost is a
function not only of the probability of punishment per se, but also, as I noted
earlier, of the difference between the probability of punishment given guilt
and the probability of punishment given innocence. (A partial offset, how-
ever, is that there would be an additional disincentive to becoming a habitual
offender.) The expected cost of punishing first-time offenders also would
fall. Prosecutors would find it so much easier to convict habitual offenders,
guilty or not, that their incentives to prosecute first-time offenders would be
impaired (assuming that prosecutors operate with a budget constraint and, as
suggested earlier, want to maximize convictions weighted by length of sen-
tence, subject to that constraint).
The most important exception to the exclusion of character evidence,
found in Rule 609, concerns the use of such evidence in cross-examination.
If a defendant or a witness has been convicted within the previous ten years
of a crime involving fraud or other deceit, the prosecutor or plaintiff (the rule
applies to civil cases as well as criminal ones and to all witnesses, not just
the parties) has a right to use that conviction on cross-examination to "im-
peach" (challenge the credibility of) his testimony. Any other felony con-
viction within the preceding ten-year period can be used for this purpose as
well if the judge concludes that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial
effect.
The rationale of the rule is that a person who has flouted the criminal law
in the past cannot be trusted to testify truthfully. This may be, but it is
doubtful that he is more unlikely to take his oath seriously than a first-time
106. See Joel Schrag & Suzanne Scotchmer, Crime and Prejudice: The Use of Character Evi-
dence in Criminal Trials, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 319, 337 (1994). This is related to one of the ob-
jections discussed earlier to letting the bus case go to the jury.
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offender who thinks he can lie his way to an acquittal. 107 There is no basis
for supposing that recidivists are more likely than first-time offenders to lie;
both are criminals, and the incentive of a criminal to lie is unrelated to
whether he has committed one crime or more than one. What is probably
true, though only loosely related (through the heavier punishment of recidi-
vists) to whether the defendant is a recidivist, is that a defendant's incentive
to lie increases in proportion to the severity of the punishment he faces if
convicted. The relevant datum is the punishment he faces, not whether he is
a recidivist. On balance, there is probably no benefit in enhanced accuracy
to allowing the use of prior-crimes evidence in cross-examination. But there
is a cost-the same cost as the cost of allowing prior-crimes evidence to be
used to prove a criminal propensity. Despite the limiting instruction to
which the defendant is entitled, the jury cannot be expected to confine its
consideration of prior-crimes evidence to the issue of the defendant's credi-
bility. Rule 609 thus undermines the deterrence of habitual offenders by re-
ducing the probability that a habitual offender who testifies will be acquitted,
thereby deterring habitual offenders from testifying. The jury is apt to infer
guilt from the defendant's failing to testify (and this, once again, regardless
of any limiting instructions).
E. Repairs and Settlement Offers
1. The subsequent-repairs rule and the issue of cognitive illusion.
Rule 407 excludes evidence that the defendant took steps after the acci-
dent or other incident that is the basis of the plaintiff s suit to prevent a recur-
rence.108 This evidence might be probative, because the steps that the defen-
dant took may show that the accident could have been prevented at modest
cost. I mentioned the rule earlier but return to it here in order to examine the
argument that the trial of accident cases is contaminated by the cognitive il-
lusion known as "hindsight bias."10 9 Rule 407 may be designed not only to
reduce the cost of accidents by encouraging remedial measures but also to
combat hindsight bias-what in prospect may have been highly unlikely may
in retrospect appear to have been inevitable. I am not sure how important
this function of the rule is. Hindsight bias is a cognitive illusion of which we
are all aware, as is indicated by the currency of such expressions as "the wis-
dom of hindsight." What is more, the concept of a "freak accident" is fa-
miliar, and it encapsulates the idea that accidents can be very low probability
107. If the defendant is innocent, presumably he will give Iruthful testimony. My criticism is
limited to the case in which evidence of a prior conviction is used to impeach a criminal defendant,
as opposed to other witnesses.
108. See FED. R. EVID. 407.
109. See Jolls et al., supra note 36, at 1523-25.
1527July 1999]
HeinOnline  -- 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1527 1998-1999
STANFORD LA W RE VIEW
events. One might expect a defendant's lawyer to be able to explain to a jury
that, while of course the accident did happen, the probability that it would
have happened was slight.110 Furthermore, hindsight bias is often rational
(for example, when the occurrence of an accident shows that a hypothetical
possibility was a real one) and thus not an illusion at all."
There is experimental evidence that juries are subject to the irrational
form of hindsight bias.' 12 But the evidence is limited and also weak-though
not because it is based on experiments using mock juries. Although the be-
havior of mock juries cannot automatically be extrapolated to real ones, an
experiment designed to test a difference (such as between an ex ante and an
ex post determination of care) need not be invalidated by the discrepancy
between experimental and real-world conditions.1 3 To reject studies of
hindsight because the experimental subjects were not real jurors requires a
reason to think that if mock jurors exhibit hindsight bias, real ones do not;
and it is by no means obvious what that reason would be. The problems with
the studies are particularistic rather than fundamental. In neither the LaBine
and LaBine nor the Kamin and Rachlinski study was the jury instructed on
burden of proof; in neither did the jury deliberate; and in both they may have
favored liability in the ex post situation not because of hindsight bias but be-
cause of their substantive views on liability (many jurors probably believe
that people who cause accidents should pay for them regardless of fault). t14
There is experimental evidence that deliberation increases the accuracy of
jury verdicts.115 And the fact that an instruction which warned the jury about
hindsight bias had no effect in the Kamin and Rachlinski study (no such in-
struction was given in the LaBine and LaBine study) supports the conjecture
that what looks like hindsight bias is really just a difference in substantive
110. For experimental evidence that hindsight bias can be reduced or even eliminated by em-
phasizing the role of chance in human affairs and hence the probabilistic character of many events,
see generally David Wasserman, Richard 0. Lempert & Reid Hastie, Hindsight and Causality, 17
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 30 (1991).
111. See Mark Kelman, Behavioral Economics as Part of a Rhetorical Duet: A Response to
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1577, 1584 (1998); Mark Kelman, David E. Follas &
Hilary Folger, Decomposing Hindsight Bias, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 251, 253-54 (1998).
112. See generally Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ; Ex Ante: Determining
Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995); Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, De-
terminations of Negligence and the Hindsight Bias, 20 LAWv & HUM. BEHAV. 501 (1996). In con-
trast, in an experimental study using state court judges as the experimental subjects, Viscusi, supra
note 51, found much less hindsight bias than the previous studies had found.
113. See Saks, supra note 7, at 8.
114. See Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 112, at 100-01; Kelman, supra note 111, at 1584;
LaBine & LaBine, supra note 112, at 512. Hence Rule 411 excludes evidence that the defendant
had liability insurance.
115. See, e.g., Gail S. Goodman, Ann E. Tobey, Jennifer M. Batterman-Faunce, Holly Orcutt,
Sherry Thomas, Cheryl Shapiro & Toby Sachsenmaier, Face-to-Face Confrontation: Effects of
Closed-Circuit Technology on Children's Eyewitness Testimony and Jurors' Decisions, 22 LAwI &
HUM. BEHAV. 165, 200 (1998); Hastie et al., supra note 47, at 305.
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standards. Of course, this point cannot be of much comfort to supporters of
trial by jury, since it implies that the jury is disobeying the law. Such dis-
obedience will generate legally unsound outcomes as surely as will cognitive
illusions.
I am left uncertain as to what weight concern with hindsight bias should
have in the design of rules of evidence for negligence cases. The broader
issue, which I cannot adequately address within the compass of this article
and which in any event is not primarily an economic issue, is whether cogni-
tive illusions seriously undermine the accuracy of the factfinding process in
trials, and if so what ought to be done, given that judges may be subject to
them to the same or almost the same extent as jurors. But I note that if the
direction of the resulting bias is known, it can be offset by revising other
features of the legal process. Suppose, for example, that juries have a pro-
pensity to acquit guilty defendants but judges do not have a propensity either
to acquit guilty defendants or to convict innocent ones. Then, as we saw
earlier, the innocent defendants will tend to waive their right to a jury; so we
need to worry only or mainly about the guilty ones. We can discourage them
from exercising their right to trial by jury by increasing the reward for "ac-
ceptance of responsibility," which under the federal sentencing guidelines is
essentially a sentencing discount for pleading guilty and thus waiving all trial
rights. This need not be done by reducing the sentences of those who plead
guilty, thus undermining deterrence. It can be done by increasing the sen-
tences of those who do not plead guilty.
2. The inadmissibility of settlement offers.
The rationale for excluding settlement offers from evidence is straight-
forward. Although such information would be relevant in showing how the
party who made the offer evaluated the strength of his case and therefore
how strong his case probably is, allowing this type of evidence to be pre-
sented at trial would increase the cost of settling cases and so reduce the
number of settlements. 116 Plaintiffs would tend to make unrealistically high
demands in order to signal (in the event of trial) the strength of their case,
and defendants would tend to make unrealistically low offers for the same
reason. As a result, it would be more difficult to negotiate to a mutually ac-
ceptable settlement. This would be a bad thing, unless the social costs of
settlement exceed the social cost of trials, which is unlikely in an era of
heavy caseloads. And the evidence of settlement offers would not improve
trials because it would be manipulated by the parties to create misleading
signals.
116. See Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Keeping Society in the Dark: On the
Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court, 26 RAND J. EcoN. 203, 214-16 (1995).
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F. Hearsay
Hearsay or secondhand evidence is evidence of what an out-of-court de-
clarant said, offered to establish the truth of that statement. One might have
thought that a rule governing the admissibility of hearsay evidence would be
a footnote to Rule 403, but instead, because of its complexity, it gets its own
article of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Article VIII). More radically, one
might wonder why there needs to be a hearsay rule at all. The only reason to
have rules excluding evidence that does not impose indirect costs (such as
subsequent-repairs evidence) is that the inexperienced trier of fact, the jury,
will give too much weight to the evidence, even if given a limiting instruc-
tion or other guidance by the judge. Much of the "evidence" on which peo-
ple act in their personal lives and their careers is hearsay, so one might ex-
pect jurors to be experienced in sifting and weighing hearsay evidence.
Even so, the hearsay rule probably can be justified by the "waste of
time" factor in Rule 403, or more precisely the costs of the trial process. Be-
cause the jury, unlike the judiciary in an inquisitorial system, does not en-
gage in an active search for evidence, it cannot terminate the evidentiary pro-
cess at the point at which the benefits of a further search would exceed the
costs. The hearsay rule helps to do this for the jury by excluding an indefi-
nite mass of generally dubious evidence.1 7 The many exceptions to the rule
allow into evidence those forms of hearsay that have probative value
equivalent to that of first-hand evidence (for example, a statement against
interest-a kind of statement that one is unlikely to make unless it is true).
The hearsay rule can also be understood as working in tandem with Rules
402 and 403 to counteract incentives to overinvest in evidence.
G. Testamentary Privileges and Exclusionary Rules
Rule 501 deals with privilege but does not enumerate the privileges rec-
ognized in federal litigation. It provides merely that the existence of privi-
lege shall be governed by federal or, where appropriate, state common law,
except as superseded by statutes or the Constitution. I shall examine the
major privileges briefly.
1. The marital privileges.
The rationale of the marital privileges 18 is similar to that of the repair
and settlement rules: collateral costs. A confession to one's spouse that one
117. For a contrary view, argued from a broadly economic perspective, see Kaplow, supra
note 98, at 1794-1804.
118. There are two marital privileges. The testimonial privilege applies to all communica-
tions, whether made before or during the marriage, the public disclosure of which might undermine
the marriage, but only the spouse asked to testify can invoke this privilege. The marital-
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had committed a crime would be highly probative evidence of guilt and no
more confusing, prejudicial, time-wasting, etc. than any other confession
offered in evidence. It is excluded out of fear of weakening a marriage by
making spouses distrustful of each other. Whether this fear is justified is
doubtful. The privilege might actually induce some people to marry who
would not otherwise do so, and marriages induced by a desire for evidentiary
advantage are unlikely to be stable. More important, by lowering the cost of
crime for married people, the privilege encourages (though no doubt only
very slightly) such people to commit crimes; and the commission of a crime
by a spouse is a highly destabilizing event for a marriage. A stronger argu-
ment could be made for the privilege if it were limited to civil cases.
Even if the benefits of marital privilege are slight, the costs in valuable
evidence forgone also may be slight; so, on balance, there may be little gain
from abolition. If the privilege were abolished, and this were widely known,
spouses would be much less likely to make damaging admissions to each
other; so abolition (just as with the settlement-offer rule) would not create a
cornucopia of valuable evidence. Compare the repair rule. Allowing evi-
dence of subsequent repairs to be introduced at a trial would reduce the in-
centive to make such repairs but would not eliminate it, because the benefits
of the repairs in averting future liability would probably outweigh future evi-
dentiary costs. So abolishing the subsequent-repairs rule would generate
some evidence, though the social cost of the evidence in reduced safety
might exceed its social benefit in more accurate determinations of liability.
The benefits of admitting wrongful conduct to one's spouse are smaller (and
so abolishing marital privilege might cause such admissions to dry up),
though perhaps not wholly negligible; the admission may be necessary in
order to elicit valuable assistance from the spouse in evading punishment.
2. The laityer-client privilege.
The most important testamentary privilege is the lawyer-client privilege.
The lawyer cannot be forced to divulge statements made to him by his client
in the course of their professional relationship. I want to focus on the appli-
cation of the privilege to statements made in the course or contemplation of
litigation, rather than to statements made in the course of seeking legal ad-
vice with respect to contemplated acts. 119 As in the case of a confession to
one's spouse, a confession to one's lawyer would be highly probative evi-
dence of guilt. The rationale for its exclusion is that the adversary process
communications privilege, which is the one I shall focus on, can be invoked by either spouse, but it
is limited to communications made during the marriage.
119. The different considerations applicable to the two types of statement are emphasized in
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in Litigation: Its Ef-
fects and Social Desirability, 102 HARV. L. REV. 565 (1989).
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would not work well if parties could not speak to their lawyers in confidence.
To evaluate this rationale, we must consider, as with the subsequent-repairs
rule and the marital privileges, what consequences would result from abro-
gating the lawyer-client privilege. One consequence would be to make cli-
ents much more guarded about what they told their lawyers. As a result, not
much valuable evidence would be obtained by making lawyers subject to
being called as witnesses against their clients. Once again the benefits of
abolishing the privilege would be slight, unless "chilling" lawyer-client con-
versations were considered a public good. Another consequence of abolish-
ing the lawyer-client privilege would be that potential litigants would invest
more in learning at least the rudiments of law, so that they could speak to
their lawyers with minimum risk of making damaging admissions. Abro-
gating the privilege might thus increase enrollment at law schools!
Third, lawyers, fearful of extracting damaging admissions from their cli-
ents, might fail to elicit information that the client was unaware would help
his case.120 Fourth, and probably most important, abrogation would encum-
ber the trial process and confuse juries. The same person might be appearing
both as the advocate for a party and as a witness against that party or the
party would have to change lawyers as soon as he discovered that he had
made a damaging admission to his current lawyer. He might have to change
lawyers more than once, since he would be telling his story to each new law-
yer in turn.
The case for an evidentiary privilege is greatly weakened if the people
entitled to invoke it either do not know about it or would not be affected by
its abrogation.121 In the limiting case, where abolition of a privilege would
have no deterrent effect on the creation of evidence, abolition would be all
benefits and no costs. Consider the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Ap-
parently most people are unaware that such a privilege exists. 122 How many
people (of the few who are aware of its existence) who decide to consult a
psychotherapist despite the continuing stigma that mental illness carries in
our society would be deterred by fear that the psychotherapist might some-
day be called as a witness against him?123
120. This point is emphasized in Ronald 3. Allen, Mark F. Grady, Daniel D. Polsby & Mi-
chael S. Yashko, A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doc-
trine, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 359 (1990).
121. See SECTION OF LITIGATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 79, at 100-02.
122. See Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical Exami-
nation of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C. L. REV. 893, 925 (1982).
123. In some cases, the dispute giving rise to litigation might cause psychological distress that
would make one consult a psychotherapist, provided it would not hurt one's litigation chances.
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3. The exclusionary rule in search and seizure.
The point I have been emphasizing-that abrogating rules of privilege
might yield only a meager evidentiary harvest-is applicable to other exclu-
sionary rules, notably the much-criticized rule excluding evidence obtained
by an illegal search or seizure. Such evidence is generally highly probative,
and sometimes essential, and its exclusion has seemed a disproportionate
sanction for police misconduct. Yet most of the people who make this criti-
cism do not argue that the misconduct should be condoned or redefined as
proper conduct; they merely advocate the substitution of other sanctions that
would not involve excluding the fruits of the illegal search. If the substitute
sanctions were effective in deterring the misconduct, there would not be any
fruits, and so there would be no net gain from the standpoint of accuracy in
adjudication. Instead, the critics should be advocating either that the stan-
dard for determining whether a search is illegal should be redefined, and spe-
cifically that searches should be deemed illegal only if the evidentiary bene-
fits do not equal or exceed the costs of the search to the victim; or that the
only sanction for an illegal search should be a suit for compensatory dam-
ages. The latter approach would require the police, in effect, to "buy" the
fruits of their "illegal" searches from the victims, which they presumably
would do when the evidentiary benefits exceeded the costs to the victim of
the search.
4. Compulsory self-incrimination.
The most hallowed, and yet at the same time one of the most question-
able, of the evidentiary privileges is the constitutional privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination. Concerns with the use of torture to extract con-
fessions are understandable and could be given an economic rationale, but
these concerns could be allayed by prohibiting torture (including its attenu-
ated forms, such as relay questioning and the "third degree") and making
punishment for contempt of court, whether by fine, imprisonment, or forfei-
ture of the right to defend, the sole sanction for a refusal to testify. The
privilege denies the court highly probative evidence, and the benefits of the
privilege are exceedingly difficult to pin down. The best argument for it is
the
strong policy in favor of government's leaving people alone .... [Tihe gov-
ernment should not disturb the peace of an individual by way of compulsory
appearances and compulsory disclosures which may lead to his conviction un-
less sufficient evidence exists to establish probable cause. Obviously, if the in-
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dividual's peace is to be preserved, the government must obtain its prima facie
case from sources other than the individual. 124
But this concern (which parallels the argument discussed earlier for placing
the burden of producing evidence on plaintiffs rather than defendants) could
be taken care of by cutting off the privilege as soon as the government has
gathered enough evidence from independent sources to indict, and by limit-
ing the amount of time that the government could demand of the suspect for
answering questions. 15
One way to pose the issue of abolishing the privilege is to adopt, in a
manner congenial to economists, the ex ante perspective and ask whether, if
the privilege protects only (or mainly) the guilty, people choosing behind the
veil of ignorance, and so not knowing whether they will be victims of crime
or criminals (or mistakenly prosecuted), would support or reject the privi-
lege. Since only a modest fraction of the community will become criminals
or even criminal suspects, and since the only cost to the criminal from the
abrogation of the privilege would be to make it more difficult for him to
avoid his just deserts, there might be an overwhelming vote in favor of abro-
gation.
The preceding paragraph began to relax the implicit assumption that the
only people who make damaging admissions are guilty. An innocent person
can be suspected of crime, and he may say things that can be used to weave
the net of suspicion more tightly around him; or he may simply have a suspi-
cious cast of countenance. The greater the danger that the abolition of the
privilege would lead to some erroneous convictions, the stronger the case for
the privilege. This point bears on an unraveling problem that the right to
waive privilege creates. Suppose that only guilty people would make the
kind of damaging admissions that the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination (and also the lawyer-client and marital privileges) enables de-
fendants to avoid or conceal. Then the innocent would always waive the
privilege in order to signal their innocence.126 Anyone who did not waive the
privilege would properly be considered guilty. This is the basis on which
jurors often infer guilt from the defendant's refusal to take the stand, even
though they are told not to draw any inference of guilt from such a refusal.
If, however, the innocent too bear a cost of waiving privilege, then the re-
fusal to waive it cannot be reliably interpreted as a sign of guilt. Judges who
want jurors to take seriously the principle that guilt should not be inferred
124. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 225 1, at 317 (John
T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961). McNaughton's entire discussion of the arguments for the
privilege is exemplary. See id. at 295-318.
125. I do not consider the quite distinct problems presented by the assertion of the privilege in
nonlitigation settings, such as hearings before congressional committees.
126. See generally Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. Cn. L. REV. 1
(1998).
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from a refusal to waive the privilege against self-incrimination will have to
come up with a credible explanation for why an innocent person might fear
the consequences of testifying. I am not sure there is a credible explanation;
the danger of an innocent person's making admissions that would lead the
jury to think him guilty may be theoretical rather than real.
The criminal defendant's decision whether to testify, thus waiving his
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, can be modeled as fol-
lOWS: 127
p =pxI + (1 - t)p 2 + tp 3 t 2  (8)
where p is the probability that the defendant will be found guilty, pt the
probability of guilt generated by the other evidence in the case (xi), p2 the
probability of guilt that the jury will infer if he does not take the stand, p3 the
probability of guilt that the jury will infer if he takes the stand and testifies
(with x2 being the testimony that he will give), and t being the decision
whether to testify (with t taking a value of 1 if he testifies and 0 if he does
not). If he testifies, the middle term on the right-hand side of Equation (8) is
wiped out, but if his testimony is damaging to him, then the third term
(which becomes simply p3 x2) will be positive. If he declines to testify, the
third term disappears but the second term is positive. The decision to testify
will depend, therefore, on a comparison of the middle term in the decline-to-
testify case with the third term in the testify case.
This approach can be used to model any case in which the absence of
evidence gives rise to an inference, as in versions discussed earlier of the
McDonnell Douglas scenario and the hypothetical bus case, and in cases of
statistical evidence with low significance levels. In the bus case, for exam-
ple, p would be the probability that the owner of the bus that injured the
plaintiff was Company A (the defendant); p2 would be the contribution to p if
the only evidence is the percentage of buses owned by A and if this implies
that the plaintiff is withholding evidence that the bus in question was actually
owned by B (that is, if t = 0); and P3 would be the contribution to p if the
plaintiff puts in additional evidence (x2), beyond the bare statistic, concern-
ing ownership.
H. Expert Witnesses128
Articles VI and VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence contain a number
of provisions relating to witnesses, especially expert witnesses. The most
127. I am indebted to Anup Malani for this formulation.
128. The discussion in this section draws upon Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of
the Economic Expert Witness, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. (forthcoming 1999).
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important are Rule 602, which confines nonexpert witnesses to testifying
from first-hand knowledge, and Rule 702, which permits an expert witness to
testify about matters within his area of expertise "in the form of an opin-
ion. ' 129 An opinion is an inference drawn from a combination of first-hand
observation and background knowledge. If one sees dark clouds and offers
an opinion that it is about to rain, the opinion represents a combination of the
observation of the clouds with one's background knowledge about weather
signs. The extensive background knowledge that denotes a person as an ex-
pert in some field enables him to offer opinions that would be irresponsibly
speculative from a lay person.
Because of the technical complexity of many of the issues that arise in
modem lawsuits, heavy reliance on expert witnesses seems to be the only
alternative to moving to a system of specialized rather than (largely) gener-
alist courts (a system which would have its own problems). 130 There is con-
siderable dissatisfaction with the use of expert witnesses. This dissatisfac-
tion has two main sources, which are related. First, because the experts are
paid by the respective parties, it is feared that they are partisans of whoever
hired them, "hired guns" rather than disinterested, and hence presumptively
truthful, witnesses. This of course does not distinguish them sharply from a
number of other types of witness, notably the parties themselves, who once
were forbidden on this ground to testify. Second, it is feared that expert wit-
nesses can mislead judges and juries more readily than lay witnesses, be-
cause experts are more difficult to pick apart on cross-examination; they can
hide behind an impenetrable expertise expressed in an unintelligible jargon.
Even if they are demolished on cross-examination by a lawyer who has care-
fully prepared with his own expert, the jury may not understand the questions
and answers in the cross-examination well enough to realize that the expert
has been demolished. A subordinate concern, closely related to the concern
with intelligibility, is that opposing experts often simply cancel each other
out. The expected outcome is unaffected, and so the use of the experts cre-
ates added costs without any benefits.
None of these concerns, however, seems especially grave, provided-a
vital qualification to which I'll return-that the expert is testifying in an area
in which there is a consensus on the essential substantive and methodological
premises
1. Partisanship.
Regarding the first concern, four points need to be made:
129. FED. K EVID. 702. However, Rule 701 also permits very limited opinion testimony by
lay witnesses.
130. See POSNER, supra note 26, at 244-72. But it is important to realize that specialized
courts are a possible solution to the perceived problems with using expert witnesses.
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First, because most expert witnesses, unlike most lay witnesses, are re-
peat players, they have a financial interest in creating and preserving a repu-
tation for being honest and competent. Any public judicial criticism of a
witness (in an opinion, whether or not formally published, or even in the
transcript of a trial or other hearing) is apt to impair the expert's career as a
witness, sometimes fatally, because the criticism is likely to be brought up in
subsequent cross-examination of this expert.131 Many expert witnesses,
moreover, are employed by consulting firms, which have a corporate reputa-
tion that can be damaged by the errors of any of their employees. Professors
may incur heavy nonpecuniary costs in diminished academic reputation
(something they greatly value, or else they probably would not be in acade-
mia) if they are shown to be careless or dishonest witnesses.
This discussion does not provide a complete answer to the concern with
partisanship, because it is also the repeat player who has an incentive to
please his client, so that he will be hired in the future. Expert witnesses can-
not lawfully be paid on a contingent basis. So the one-time expert witness
has nothing to lose or gain from giving dishonest or slanted testimony.
Second, the expert witness who has a record of academic publication will
be "kept honest" by the fact that, should he try to repudiate his academic
work on the stand, he will be open to devastating cross-examination. This
implies that a warning flag should go up whenever an expert witness either
has no record of academic publication or is testifying about matters on which
he has never published. Not only is such an expert less likely to testify truth-
fully, but the lawyer's choice of him as an expert witness implies that the
lawyer was unable to find a genuinely knowledgeable person who was will-
ing to testify in support of the client's position.
Third, because of the adversary character of the American system of liti-
gation, and the requirement that the expert disclose his evidence during the
pretrial discovery process (thus before the trial begins), expert evidence is
subject to intense critical scrutiny.132 This should deter at least some irre-
sponsible expert testimony. In the case of economics, where the tradition of
replicating previous academic studies is relatively weak, 133 a study conducted
131. See Thomas R_ Ireland, Walter D. Johnson & Paul C. Taylor, Economic Science and He-
donic Damage Analysis in Light of Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 10 J. FORENsIC ECON. 139, 156 n.10
(1997) ("A favorable mention in a reported case is of real benefit to a [forensic, that is, a testifying]
economist, while an unfavorable mention is a major cost"). For an example of "unfavorable men-
tion," see generally In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 1996 WL 351178
(N.D. I11. June 24, 1996).
132. As an example of what awaits expert witnesses in cross-examination, see Stan V. Smith,
Pseudo-Economists-The New Junk Scientists, 47 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 95 (1996).
133. This may be why academic researchers have adopted the 5 percent significance level
rather than a 10 or 20 percent level. The less frequently studies are replicated, the more important it
is to subject them to the internal discipline of a stiff significance test. See Lempert, supra note 95,
at 1099.
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for purposes of litigation is likely to receive more intensive scrutiny than an
academic study, even one published in a refereed journal.
Fourth, an expert witness's evidence is inadmissible if it does not satisfy
the methodological standards in the expert's field. 134 Because this is easier
to determine than whether the evidence is sound, the rule acts as a screen
against "junk science." The mesh of the screen may actually be too fine for
statistical evidence, as we saw earlier. Notice that the existence of the screen
may deter the preparation of subprofessional expert testimony, as the expert
will worry that his reputation may be impaired if his evidence is excluded for
failure to measure up to the standards of his discipline.
If market incentives kept experts fully honest, defendants' lawyers would
often not introduce expert testimony at all, because they would find it diffi-
cult to locate a reputable expert who would contradict the plaintiff's expert.
The "softer" the science relevant to the case, the more often both sides can be
expected to present expert witnesses.
2. Intelligibility.
The second concern with the use of expert witnesses, intelligibility, has
undoubted merit, but not as much as intuition might suggest. For it ignores
incentive effects. A witness who cannot make himself understood by the
court is unlikely to be persuasive. This is a particularly important considera-
tion in jury trials, because jurors often give less weight to credentials than to
clarity. 135 If expert testimony is clearer in jury than judge trials, juries may
understand expert testimony as well as judges even if the average judge is
somewhat brighter than the average juror.
This is not a complete answer to the criticism of unintelligibility. Many
fields are so technical that it is unrealistic to expect the average juror or
judge to be able to understand all the criticisms of a study conducted by an
expert in the field. (That is why increased technical complexity of evidence
is not a powerful argument against the use of juries.) A partial solution, sug-
gested by a study, is that jurors give great weight to credentials when the ex-
pert testimony is very complex. 36 This is rational. The more credentialed
expert has a larger potential reputation loss from giving evidence that falls
below acceptable professional standards.
134. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Navarro
v. Fuji Heavy Industries, Ltd., 117 F.3d 1027, 1031 (7th Cir. 1997); People Who Care v. Rockford
Board of Education, 111 F.3d 528, 537 (7th Cir. 1997); Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316,
318-19 (7th Cir. 1996); FAIGMAN et al., supra note 67, at 2-45.
135. See Daniel W. Shuman, Anthony Champagne & Elizabeth Whitaker, Juror Assessments
of the Believability of Expert Witnesses: A Literature Review, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 371,379 (1996).
136. See Joel Cooper, Elizabeth A. Bennett & Holly L. Sukel, Complex Scientific Testimony:
How Do Jurors Make Decisions?, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 379,391-92 (1996).
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Another way to deal with the problem of the unintelligibility of complex
expert testimony would be more frequent appointment of court-appointed
experts. The power to make such appointments is explicitly conferred on
federal judges by Rule 706, yet it is rarely exercised. 137 The usual objection
is that it is impossible for a judge to know whether he is picking a genuine
neutral to be the court's expert. This objection can be overcome by borrow-
ing a leaf from a common method of selecting arbitrators: Each party
chooses an arbitrator and the two arbitrators choose a neutral, who generally
casts the deciding vote. The parties' experts could, similarly, agree on a
neutral expert who would be appointed by the court and would testify either
along with or instead of the parties' experts. 138 His neutrality would quite
properly give his views decisive weight with the jury. It would not matter
whether the jurors understood him; his conclusion would be credible because
of his neutrality and expertise. Things can be rationally believed though not
understood. People rationally believe that airline travel is safe without
knowing what keeps the plane in the air.
The use of a court-appointed expert is problematic when (for example, in
the damages phase of the case) the expert witness's bottom line is a number.
For then, in the case of opposing witnesses, the trier of fact can "split the
difference," after weighting each witness's estimate by its plausibility.
(Without such weighting, the defendant's expert would testify to zero dam-
ages and the plaintiff's to infinite damages.) An estimation derived in this
manner may be superior to that of a solitary expert witness.139
3. The expert cancel-out effect.
The third concern about expert testimony, that opposing experts often
cancel each other out, would also disappear if the parties' experts selected a
neutral expert to be the only expert witness. But is it a real concern? It
might seem that whenever the opposing experts canceled each other out, the
parties would agree not to call them, in order to reduce the expense of litiga-
tion. This happens occasionally, but not often-maybe because a lawyer
137. See JOE S. CECIL & THOMAS E. WILLGING, COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS: DEFINING
THE ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 706 (1993); FAIGMAN et
al., supra note 71, at 43-44.
138. For the origin and discussion of this proposal, see Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometrics in
the Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1096 (1985). A variant of this procedure has been em-
ployed in at least one case. See Leesona Corp. v. Varta Batteries, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1304, 1312
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also SECTION OF LITIGATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 79,
at 246.
139. See LUKE M. FROEB & BRUCE H. KOBAYASHI, COMPETITION IN THE PRODUCTION OF
COSTLY INFORMATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ADVERSARIAL VERSUS COURT-APPOINTED
PRESENTATION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working
Paper No. 93-005, 1993).
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who suggested it would be understood to be signaling that he thought his
expert less credible than the opponent's expert.
The use of expert witnesses is most problematic when there is insuffi-
cient common ground to keep the witness honest. This used to be, and to
some extent still is, the situation with regard to antitrust economics. A per-
fectly respectable economist might be an antitrust "hawk," another equally
respectable economist a "dove." Each might have a long list of reputable
academic publications fully consistent with systematically pro-plaintiff or
pro-defendant testimony. A judge or jury would therefore have little basis
for choosing between them, especially since each witness might be reasoning
with impeccable logic from his premises-premises equally plausible to a
lay audience. There might be no neutral expert with relevant expertise, in
which event a court-appointed expert would perforce be a partisan. I do not
have a solution to this problem.
4. An additional social cost of expert testimony.
A social cost of expert evidence that is not discussed at all in the litera-
ture on expert witnesses is the deflection of academic researchers, especially
those with tenure, from scholarly work to testifying. Although by giving
academics access to data that they would not otherwise have testifying may
occasionally pay academic dividends, the net output of American universities
(weighting quantity by quality) probably is not greater as a result of profes-
sors' being in demand as expert witnesses. If academic salaries were equal
to the social marginal product of academics, the deflection of academics
from research would not reduce social welfare. But if academic research
produces social gains not captured by the researcher, and if that surplus is
less than the surplus created by academics testifying, then the practice of
hiring academics to testify does impose social costs. The second "if," how-
ever, is indeed iffy. Accurate adjudication creates social benefits (in par-
ticular, enhanced deterrence of wrongful conduct) not wholly captured by the
expert witnesses in the fees they charge. In addition, the opportunity to make
extra income may draw able people into academia who would otherwise
choose some other occupation. But this is a weaker point. Moonlighting
opportunities may enable universities to pay lower salaries to professors, and
so may not affect the supply of academics. And since testimonial opportuni-
ties are randomly distributed across the academic spectrum in relation to
value of research output, the principal effect of moonlighting income, even if
it is not offset by lower academic salaries, may be to alter the distribution of
academics across fields without regard to social product.
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5. Recommendations for reform.
Expert testifying is here to stay. We should consider how it might be
improved. I have suggested greater use of court-appointed experts selected
by the method used to pick a neutral arbitrator. I have also mentioned judi-
cial criticism as a method of bringing reputation costs to bear on the errant
expert. Although there is a danger that such criticism may be uninformed, if
so the damage to the expert's reputation will be less. The next time he testi-
fies he will have an opportunity to try to rebut the criticism if it is thrown up
at him on cross-examination. And his lawyer may be able to persuade the
judge in the new case to prevent the use of the earlier judge's criticism on
cross-examination, on the ground that its probative value is slight in relation
to its prejudicial effect.
Two further measures for improving the quality of expert evidence are
worth considering. First, each professional association from whose member-
ship expert witnesses are drawn could maintain a roster of all testimonial
appearances by members. The roster would contain abstracts of each mem-
ber's testimony and any criticisms of the testimony by the judge in the case
or by the lawyers or experts on the other side of the lawsuit. This would en-
able the profession to monitor its members' adherence to high standards of
probity and care in their testimonial forays. Procedures could be established
to enable members to challenge inaccuracies, and, having thus been vali-
dated, the roster could be made available to the courts.
I am not appealing to altruism in making this suggestion. Each associa-
tion, which is to say the members (or rather the majority of them) of the as-
sociation, would benefit from the maintenance of the roster. The effect of
the roster in deterring the hiring as expert witnesses of disreputable members
of the profession represented by the association would increase the associa-
tion's prestige. It would also increase the consulting incomes of its reputable
members by reducing the competition of the disreputable members of the
profession. The incentive to maintain such a roster would thus be the same
as that of any other form of professional self-policing: to reduce the external
cost that the misbehavior of one member of a profession imposes on other
members.
Second, lawyers who call an expert witness could be required to disclose
the name of all the experts whom they approached as possible witnesses be-
fore settling on the one testifying. This would alert the jury to the problem
of "witness shopping." Suppose the lawyer for the plaintiff hired the first
economist, agronomist, physicist, physician, etc. whom he interviewed, and
the lawyer for the defendant hired the twentieth one whom he interviewed.
A reasonable inference is that the defendant's case is weaker than the plain-
tiffs. The parallel is to conducting twenty statistical tests of a hypothesis
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and reporting (as significant at the five percent level) the only one that sup-
ported the hypothesis being tested.
CONCLUSION
The length of this article and the number of distinct issues discussed in it
require a recapitulation of some of the more important and interesting points:
1. The process by which evidence is obtained, presented, and evaluated in a
trial can be fruitfully modeled in economic terms, using either a search
model or a cost-minimization model and incorporating Bayes' theorem
as a guide to rational decisionmaking under uncertainty. 140 Economic
analysis captures the major concerns about evidence law (including
"noneconomic" concerns), of which the most important from an eco-
nomic standpoint are accuracy (because accuracy usually, though not al-
ways, promotes deterrence) and cost. Economic analysis of evidence re-
veals, among other things, that the amount of evidence generated in an
unregulated adversary system may be more or less than the social opti-
mum. Economic analysis also and relatedly provides a guide to optimal
regulation of evidence. It can thus be used as a criterion for evaluating
the law of evidence. This article, like much positive economic analysis
of core doctrines and institutions of the legal system, finds a consider-
able, although far from complete, congruence between the law and the
dictates of efficiency.
2. Although the inquisitorial system (which is predominant outside of the
Anglo-American legal sphere) is superficially more efficient than the ad-
versarial system, because in principle it facilitates the optimum amount
of evidence gathering, economic analysis furnishes no convincing basis
for choosing between the systems. Among frequently overlooked con-
siderations bearing on this conclusion are (a) that the rules of evidence
enable the judge in the adversarial system to ameliorate the problem of
socially excessive evidence search, while at the same time the rules gov-
erning burden of production enable him to ameliorate the problem of so-
cially insufficient search; (b) that rational (but socially inefficient) bias is
apt to be a more serious problem with judges in an inquisitorial system
than with juries in an adversarial system; and (c) that the competitive and
highly visible character of the adversarial system operates to correct in-
centive problems created by an inquisitorial system.
3. The greater public visibility of the adversarial system, especially in jury
trials, creates an exaggerated impression of the failures of the system
relative to those of inquisitorial systems. The latter, operating with less
140. In Part II.B supra, I attempted to counter some of the criticisms that have been made of
applying Bayes' theorem, or mathematical probability more generally, to trials.
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public visibility, are better able to bury their mistakes. Similarly, the
more that plea bargaining is disfavored, as is common in inquisitorial
systems, the more accurate the criminal justice system will appear to be,
because more one-sided cases will be tried in such a system than in one
in which plea bargaining (settlement) is encouraged and where, there-
fore, most one-sided cases are pleaded out before trial.
4. Economic comparison of the inquisitorial and the adversarial systems
leads to specific predictions, such as that the former will be less con-
cerned with judicial bias, burden of production, and burden of persua-
sion.
5. A principal social value of the right of cross-examination is deterrent:
The threat of cross-examination deters some witnesses from testifying at
all and others from giving false or misleading evidence. Merely observ-
ing cross-examination, therefore, does not give a complete picture of its
social value.
6. Burdens of persuasion and production (including the seemingly "artifi-
cial" burdens of production in discrimination cases) are economizing de-
vices. The heavier burden on the plaintiff (prosecutor) in criminal than
in civil cases reflects not only the greater cost of a mistaken conviction
than a mistaken acquittal, as stressed in the earlier economic literature,
but also game-theoretic factors arising from the inequality of resources
between prosecution and defense in almost all cases.
7. Contrary to widespread belief, rational allocation of prosecutorial re-
sources reduces the probability of convicting the innocent to minute lev-
els when crime rates are high, while, also for economic reasons, the error
rate in civil cases is far lower than what the preponderance ("more likely
than not") standard of proof implies.
a. The first of these points implies that in times of rising crime rates, it
is socially efficient to reduce the procedural rights of criminal defen-
dants (as the Supreme Court has done), unless prosecutorial re-
sources are expanding as rapidly as crime rates are rising (which
they have not been).
b. The second point implies that if a class of cases can be identified in
which, after a thorough search for evidence, the probability that the
plaintiff's claim is meritorious barely exceeds fifty percent, the legal
system should refuse to litigate these cases. The social benefits of
the very slight gain in accuracy obtained by litigating them are un-
likely to be as large as the social costs of conducting trials in these
cases. This may be the answer to the question whether a plaintiff
who presents merely "naked" statistical evidence of the defendant's
liability should be allowed to get to a jury.
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8. It is a mistake, however, to use the five percent significance level that is
conventional in statistical research as a criterion of the admissibility of a
statistical study in a trial. Significance levels are relevant to the weight
to be given a study. Their academic use as criteria of publishability is a
function of considerations that do not apply in litigation, such as the need
to ration space in scholarly journals.
9. If juries are competent to resolve factual disputes, they should also be
competent to resolve disputes over the application of law to fact, notably
a dispute over whether the defendant was negligent. Judge Learned
Hand's negligence formula shows that such a dispute is purely factual.
10. The formal rules of evidence (for example as codified in the Federal
Rules of Evidence) cover only a portion of evidence law. Many so-
called substantive rules, such as the parol evidence rule of contract law,
are in actuality field-specific evidence rules. Most rules of evidence,
however classified in law, exhibit economizing properties, though there
is much room for reform.
11. When the doctrine of harmless error is modeled in economic terms, it
can be shown that the doctrine creates an incentive for prosecutors to
commit deliberate errors, and so should perhaps be modified.
12. Limiting instructions are ineffectual unless the judge is able to persuade
the jury that the excluded evidence is not probative. In other cases, no
such instruction should be given unless requested by a party, and if
given, it should not be regarded as curative of any error in the admission
of evidence.
13. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is an explicit cost-benefit
formula for determining the admissibility of evidence. It is central to the
economic theory of evidence in much the same way that the Hand for-
mula is central to the economic theory of torts. The benefits relevant to
Rule 403 are benefits in greater accuracy. The costs are both reductions
in accuracy (for example, because the evidence sought to be excluded
under the rule is confusing) and costs of administering the legal system.
The hearsay rule and a number of the other specific rules of evidence can
be subsumed under Rule 403.
14. Evidence of a defendant's prior crimes should generally be excluded
from criminal trials whether it is offered to demonstrate a propensity to
commit crimes or, on cross-examination, is offered to demonstrate a pro-
pensity to lie under oath. There is no reason to suppose that previously
convicted defendants are greater liars than current defendants who are
guilty in fact (if they are not guilty, they are less likely to lie and, as a
practical matter, it doesn't matter whether they do). Since recidivists are
punished more heavily than first offenders, it is not even clear that previ-
ously convicted defendants have a greater net propensity to commit
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crimes than persons who have not been convicted previously.141 In the
case of certain sex crimes, however, as recent amendments to the Federal
Rules of Evidence recognize, a history of prior crimes may demonstrate
the defendant's inelastic demand for this type of conduct.
15. The rules forbidding the introduction into evidence of subsequent repairs
by a tort defendant and of settlement offers by either party are justified
by the external costs of such evidence in reducing safety and reducing
the settlement rate, respectively. The subsequent-repairs rule may also
be justified by concerns with hindsight bias, but these concerns seem ex-
aggerated and in any event could be dealt with by other measures.
16. The importance of external costs in the law of evidence is further illus-
trated by the many rules of privilege (such as the marital privileges, the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, and the lawyer-client
privilege) and of exclusion (for example, of illegally obtained evidence).
Many of the conventional justifications for the privileges and exclusions
are weak, but one strong argument is that abrogating them would not
produce a rich harvest of evidence but rather would discourage people
from talking to spouse, lawyer, priest, and so on.142 Substituting other
equally effective sanctions for illegal searches and seizures would (by
definition of "equally effective") reduce the amount of illegally seized
evidence by as much as is currently accomplished by the exclusionary
rule. The principal exception to these points is the self-incrimination
rule. There is a distinct economic objection to forcing people to offer
potentially incriminating evidence. It is much the same as the economic
reason for placing the burden of production on the plaintiff rather than
the defendant in ordinary civil litigation. By forcing prosecutor or plain-
tiff to bear a significant cost of litigation, we reduce the frivolous or har-
assing use of the courts. But this is an argument for requiring probable
cause to require a potential defendant to testify rather than for the current
absolute privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
17. The growing complexity of evidence, resulting from scientific and tech-
nological progress, has placed new strains on a system that relies on lay
people (and judges are lay people in this domain) to determine facts. But
many of the criticisms of the use of expert witnesses are superficial. To
know and to understand are different things. Jurors may be able to place
warranted confidence in the testimony of an expert witness, on the basis
of signals of competence and incentive (there are market incentives for
141. If they do, however, then there is an argument for allowing prior-crimes evidence, but it
is offset by the effect of allowing such evidence on the incentives of prosecutors. They will overin-
vest in prosecuting prior rather than first offenders because the former may be easier to convict
regardless of guilt if such evidence is allowed.
142. When, however, abolition would not deter the creation of evidence because the people
entitled to invoke the privilege were unaware of it, the case for abolition is strong.
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experts to testify honestly), without being able to make an informed
evaluation of the expert's testimony. The use of expert testimony can,
however, be improved by various measures-including the maintenance
by professional associations of a roster of the forensic activities of their
members.
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